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HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY? 
THE OSCE MISSION TO ESTONIA AND ITS BALANCE SHEET 1993-1999 
 
Hanne-Margret Birckenbach
1
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this study, largely based on field research and interviews with 
current and former staff members, is the evaluation of the performance of the 
OSCE Long-term Mission to Estonia established in 1992. The analysis starts 
with an overview of the Mission’s mandate and the structure and composition 
of its staff. The strategy of ‘active conformation’ (avoidance of directly 
confronting the Estonian Government on human rights issues) adopted by the 
Mission and the allocation of priorities in the broad range of activities are 
linked to the concept of preventive diplomacy as understood by Mission’s 
diplomats. The study finds that there is a clear gender-related hierarchy. Also, 
insufficient attention is paid to strengthening the links between the Mission’s 
involvement in societal-based NGO projects supporting democratisation and 
the development of civil society and the more government-oriented activities of 
the Mission. This section is followed by a reflection on the Mission’s future 
and a compilation of suggestions by persons interviewed on how to transform 
the Mission so that it can make a significant contribution to the integration of 
the Russian-speaking minority and to the development of democracy and civil 
society in Estonia as a whole. The author then concludes by arguing that, 
although its presence was never welcomed by the Estonian State, the Mission 
has made itself too valuable to be closed down and still has a positive role to 
play in calming tensions in the country. The final conclusions seek to 
generalise the findings as regards the role of the OSCE Long-term missions in 
preventive diplomacy.               
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this study is the work of the OSCE Long-term Mission to Estonia (below: 
“Mission”) established in 1992 by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) in order to 
“promote stability, dialogue and understanding between the communities in Estonia” 
according to its mandate.  Similarly to other OSCE Long-term Missions, the Mission to 
                                                        
 1 Dr. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach is currently working as Senior Researcher at the Schleswig 
Holstein Institute for Peace Research (SHIP) [in German: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für 
Friedensforschung (SCHIFF)] in Kiel, Germany. 
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Estonia has had to act within a complex constellation from the viewpoint of history, 
traumatic experiences, actors involved and interests at work, and which is strongly 
determined by state-building mechanisms, the struggle for power and by rapid political 
change in the international world.  The background for launching the Mission is as 
follows.  After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, more than thirty percent of its 
inhabitants found themselves excluded from Estonian citizenship.  This group consisted 
of persons who had arrived in Estonia legally as citizens of the Soviet Union during 
Soviet rule, and of their descendants.  Most of them were of Russian origin; one third, 
however, consisted of persons who had arrived from Belarus, Ukraine, Poland and 
Latvia.  Together with those ethnic Russians who were accepted as Estonian citizens, 
because their families had lived in the country before 1940, they form the Russian-
speaking minority which, in certain areas, constitutes a majority.  In 1999, the number of 
non-citizens had diminished to 26 percent of the total population (375,000 persons out of 
1,440,000) either due to emigration to Russia or to naturalisation procedures based on 
the minimum standards required internationally.  About 8 percent of the Russian-
speakers had already opted for and acquired Russian citizenship as a consequence of 
discrimination against them
2 but continued to live in the country as foreign residents.  
The majority of Russian-speakers, ca 250,000, i.e. 17 % of the population, live in 
Estonia as “non-citizens with special status” and are de facto stateless persons. 
 
As a result of their discriminatory non-citizen status, tensions appeared on the domestic 
and on the bilateral level (with Russia) as well as on the international level.  The Estonian 
State perceives the exclusion of this contingent as a legitimate decision in the interest of 
national security.  For non-citizens, the same decision is unfounded and unjust.  From 
the perspective of the Russian State, it is seen as a massive violation of the human rights 
of potential Russian citizens who might wish to emigrate to Russia one day.  Finally, 
from the international point of view, a triangular minority conflict has developed
3
 which 
                                                        
 2 The requirements for obtaining Estonian citizenship (especially language training, certain 
documents such as a birth certificate and a doctor’s examination) are more than most people can 
manage or afford.  Russian citizenship can be obtained by a simplified procedure. 
 3 A state is carrying out a nationalistic policy against a minority, and a second state proclaims to act 
as a patron of the minority (Brubaker 1997). 
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risks escalating to the point of threatening European stability— a danger which is 
intensified by the fact that a similar conflict appeared in Latvia.  In the face of this 
dangerous situation, a variety of international organisations became involved, among 
them the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE).  With the strong support of particularly interested states, 
such as Sweden and Finland, and a number of transnational human rights NGOs, a 
strategy of preventive diplomacy was developed.  The Estonian case is generally 
regarded as a positive example of preventive diplomacy which has bound different state 
actors to co-operate with one another and has controlled the dynamics of the conflict.  It 
has also achieved certain progress in granting fundamental rights to most non-citizens, 
such as the right to reside in the country, the right to travel, the right to social care, to 
work permits, the right to participate in local elections as well as the right to apply for 
naturalisation.  Nonetheless, one must admit that the living conditions of Russian-
speakers deteriorated during the 1990s (Andersen 1999) and their satisfactory 
integration into political life has still not been achieved.  Disputes over the laws 
concerning citizenship, naturalisation and language have not been settled, neither 
domestically nor between Russia and Estonia, nor even internationally.  In 1999 the 
Estonian political class still refused a dialogue on related issues.  This gives reason to ask 
whether the concept of preventive diplomacy applied can be regarded as appropriate.  
Part of the burden of carrying out a strategy of preventive diplomacy was laid on the 
OSCE Long-term Mission to Estonia. This Mission is the subject of this study which 
attempts to determine the specific contribution of the Mission to a conflict prevention 
strategy.  This study thus seeks to complement previous official descriptions from a more 
independent point of view.  As in other areas, the Mission’s work represents only one—
albeit decisive— element within the broader range of instruments of preventive 
diplomacy; therefore, the impact of this element cannot be assessed without referring to 
its interaction with other instruments, in particular the interaction between the Mission 
and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and other governmental or 
non-governmental international organisations (Birckenbach 1997).  Consequently, the 
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question here is not primarily what the Mission has achieved but rather how it has 
translated it mandate into action, and how representatives of international and domestic 
actors on site— governmental as well as non-governmental— have judged its 
performance. 
A precondition of the Mission’s work was to obtain a mandate agreed upon by the 
OSCE, by disputing state actors and, above all, by the Estonian government.  Thus, the 
analysis starts with an overview of the Mission’s mandate, its reliance on the 
recommendations of a previous ODIHR fact-finding Mission, and the enrichment 
resulting from the office of the OSCE Representative to the Estonian Government 
Commission which has completed the team since 1994.  The staff of the Mission is 
described in Chapter III which emphasises both the advantages of having an international 
and intercultural team as well as the tensions deriving from this feature,  most visibly 
with respect to the gender-related hierarchy.  This is also considered in Chapter IV which 
investigates how Mission members understand the concept of preventive diplomacy and 
in what ways room is made for human rights considerations.  The focus of the study on 
hand is Chapter V which describes the Mission’s various activities and how they 
interconnect.  Chapter VI considers the Mission’s future from the perspectives of various 
state and non-state actors and presents a collection of ideas for transforming the 
Mission’s approach, reflecting both criticism as well as the need for prolongation.  The 
final chapter presents a few summarising conclusions on the Mission’s work and reflects 
on possibilities for generalisation.  
I am eternally grateful to all those who made this investigation possible.  My special 
thanks are due to the former Head of Mission Ambassador Dr. Detlof von Berg who, 
after the seminar “Minorities and Majorities in Estonia: Problems of Integration at the 
Threshold of the EU” organised by ECMI (Flensburg and Aabenraa, 22-25 May 1998), 
invited me to visit the Mission in Tallinn.  This gave me the opportunity to observe the 
work of the Mission for a fortnight in August 1998, to follow the working meetings, and 
to discuss various issues in more than 30 interviews with Mission members and other 
actors on site.  The interviewees, as a rule, spent between one and three hours answering 
my questions on (1) activities and operations within the Mission; (2) perceptions of 
Mission members regarding their work; and (3) the work of the Mission as viewed by 
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other actors in Estonia.  The list of persons interviewed (see Appendices) consists of 
several Mission members as well as Estonian government representatives, local actors in 
Tallinn and in northeastern Estonia, Estonian NGOs and social groups including non-
citizens, members of the Russian Embassy and representatives of other international 
organisations on site.  Since all interviews are confidential, the names of the persons 
interviewed are not indicated unless they have agreed to be identified.  Furthermore, all 
interviewees were informed about the aims of this investigation.  Again, I especially 
appreciate the contribution by Dr. Detlof von Berg who generously and patiently helped 
me build a first insight in the views, language and games of diplomats working with an 
OSCE Mission.  He also read a first draft of the manuscript and suggested a few 
corrections.  Thanks also go to Anna Westerholm and Dr. Markus Galdia for their 
recommendations.  
My interest in learning about the Mission’s work was not satisfied in every aspect. 
Centrepieces of its work are various types of reports to the international community.  My 
attempts to study these reports failed to a large extent.  The opportunity to carry out “a 
fact-finding mission on the Mission,” as announced in the invitation by the Head of 
Mission (HoM), was negatively affected by this lack of transparency (see below).  
Sometimes I found myself involved in the Mission’s tactics.  Although I intensively 
checked information given in the interviews by comparing it with information given in 
the literature by other experts, I am fully aware that an investigation so strongly based on 
interviews without access to the relevant documents is limited and must contain errors.  
Access to these documents would have helped compensate the tendency of the actors to 
make the interview part of their diplomatic games.  The results presented here may 
therefore be regarded as a founded hypothesis on the Mission’s work at a certain point.  
Hopefully, this study will be improved when more documents are available for quotation. 
Preventive diplomacy needs political support.  This is also the case of the work of the 
Mission to Estonia.  This study hopes to contribute through the use of the tools of a 
researcher whose duty is not to spread reservations or applause but to consider the 
subject seriously and publish the findings.  In recent years, while attending international 
seminars on minority issues and OSCE-related questions, I several times experienced 
OSCE diplomats complaining that academics, in particular when concerned with Baltic 
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affairs, tend to use a more diplomatic language and are more cautious and flattering 
towards governmental representatives than OSCE diplomats.  This study tries to escape 
from this tendency.  I would like to end this introduction by expressing my strongest 
wish that the readers of this study will recognise that— according to the findings of this 
analysis, and despite all criticisms— the Mission and its members earn high credit for their 
contribution to Estonian and European developments, and for their daily performances 
which are unparalleled.  
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II. MANDATE OF THE OSCE MISSION 
It was not an easy task to obtain the consent of the Estonian Government to make the 
citizenship conflict an issue of concern within the OSCE and to establish a Long-term 
Mission in Tallinn.  Estonia valued the OSCE as an instrument for securing its 
independence and for accelerating the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic 
States.  It was Russia which brought the conflict onto the agenda by linking it to its 
obligation to withdraw the troops.  Estonia strongly resisted at first but finally allowed 
the OSCE to establish a presence in the country.  It is not entirely clear how the 
agreement was achieved
4
 but, after lengthy negotiations, a major step was taken when 
Estonia indicated on 28 September 1992 that it was prepared to invite the OSCE to send 
an ODIHR fact-finding  mission to the country.  The ODIHR mission was composed of 
German and Finnish diplomats
5
 and  its mandate was to analyse Estonian legislation and 
its implementation according to human rights standards.  The second major step was 
taken when Estonia invited the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) to launch a Long-term 
Mission to the country.  This invitation was accepted by the CSO on 13 December 1992. 
Both steps were strongly connected.  The first HoM was already a member of the 
ODIHR fact-finding mission and the recommendations of the “Report of the CSCE 
ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation,” which prepared the brickwork of 
the Long-term Mission, are explicitly mentioned in the mandate.  The ODIHR report 
concluded that the situation of stateless Russian-speakers in Estonia gave rise to 
concern, and stated in parallel that it concurred with earlier findings in a report of the 
CoE that no international human rights instrument would recognise “the right to a 
nationality as a human right enjoyed by everyone.”  Nonetheless, the ODIHR mission 
advised “in the interest of Estonia itself to facilitate the integration of the large majority 
of the persons remaining in the country and to provide them with equal rights including 
                                                        
 4  Some authors refer to pressure from the United States (Zaagman 1999: 20). 
 5 The experts of the ODIHR Mission were: Christian Tomuschat (Professor, Faculty of Law, 
University of Bonn), Klaus Törnudd (Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland), their 
assistants Ulrich Brandenburg (CSCE Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany) and Päivi 
Kaukoranta (Legal and Human Rights Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland), and Jack 
Zetkulic (Deputy Director, CSCE ODIHR, Warsaw) as Executive Secretary. 
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citizenship as soon as possible (Tomuschat, Törnudd et al. 1997).”  For this purpose, the 
ODIHR mission suggested the following: 
72. [...] The mission therefore recommends the following specific measures in 
reference to citizenship: 
· A law detailing language requirements for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship, 
significantly lower than the level currently required, should be adopted without 
further delay. 
· Exceptions should be provided that would waive all language requirements for 
invalids and pensioners who fulfil the conditions of Article 7, paragraph 3 of the 
Citizenship Act. 
· Steps should be taken to ensure that paragraph 16 (4) of the resolution of the 
Supreme Council of 26 February 1992 shall not be applied with respect to legal 
residents of Estonia who have lost their steady income due to unemployment. 
· In full conformity with the Citizenship Act (Article 3, paragraph 6), it should be 
ensured that children born from former nationals of the USSR, who would otherwise 
be stateless, are registered as Estonian citizens. 
73. According to long-standing CSCE standards, participating States are obligated 
to facilitate family reunification. Minor children must be able to live with their 
parents and spouses must be able to join one another. Although it is certainly 
legitimate to check whether a marriage is a real and not only a fictitious one, the 
mission recommends that Estonia review its legislation and practices with a view to 
ensuring that there are no inconsistencies with the standard of family reunification. 
There should be no waiting lists compelling family members to live separately for 
years. 
74. Since freedom to leave one’s country is an undisputed rule of international 
human rights law, Estonia should do everything in its power to grant every person 
lawfully resident within its territory a real opportunity freely to travel abroad and to 
return to Estonia. For that purpose, persons who are currently stateless should be 
provided with an alien’s passport if they are no more holders of valid passports of 
the former Soviet Union. 
75. Since the only viable and realistic assumption for the future is that Estonia will 
permanently have a linguistic minority of perhaps 25-40% of the total population, 
the cultural needs of the minority will need to be taken care of on a permanent basis. 
Within the limits of available resources, due attention should therefore be given to 
the cultural and educational needs of all language groups in the country as well as to 
facilities for the effective teaching of the Estonian language to all those who need to 
learn them. 
76. The present language legislation may in certain respects require adaptation to the 
conditions of an independent State. For example, it is hardly the task of the State to 
lay down requirements for private employment contracts. If bilingual competence is 
necessary in a given situation, the potential employer will insist that any applicant 
possess the requisite qualifications. Language requirements for public service could 
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be differentiated in different parts of the country, and transitional rules could be 
liberally applied. Flexibility would alleviate tensions and help the Russian-speaking 
population to gain confidence in a future of peaceful Cupertino between all groups 
living in Estonia. Particularly in those parts of the country where one language 
dominates the rights to security of employment should accordingly by weighed 
against the right of the public to service in either Estonian or Russian. Policy models 
for developing the language legislation can be found in countries that have given a 
generous treatment to migrant workers and in CSCE States that are historically 
multilingual (such as Canada, Finland, Switzerland). 
 
Ironically, it was just the ODIHR, the human rights department of the OSCE, that 
legitimated the OSCE in Vienna to deal with the conflict over citizenship separately from 
considerations on human rights which it put last.  This highly-disputed decision (Schlager 
1997; Birckenbach 1997) was obviously determined by Estonian interests.  It also 
conformed with those of West European states to prevent a spill-over effect regarding 
citizenship rights of migrants in their countries.  Thus, Pettai is right when noting:  
“For the OSCE, its range of manoeuvrability was limited by the international 
community’s acceptance of Estonia’s basic citizenship policy and the latter’s 
principle that the Soviet-era immigrants were non-citizen residents. Although, in its 
reports the mission sometimes hinted at the need to liberalize certain provisions of 
the citizenship law, it never called for a full-scale revision of the restrictive policy. 
On several occasions in 1994, for example, the mission had to issue press statements 
reiterating its respect for Estonia’s citizenship policy and for the fact that Estonia 
had been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. The statements were 
usually meant to counter perceptions that the mission was becoming too intrusive 
into Estonian policy (Pettai 1998).” 
 
Russia agreed with this strategy when it accepted the mandate and can hardly complain.  
The people concerned and their representatives may have held a different view but their 
opinion did not matter at all in the OSCE strategy.
6  
The Mission started operating during February 1993 and was fully ready for action in 
mid-April 1993 when the first diplomats from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden and the USA had arrived.  The headquarters were located in Tallinn.  After 
severe disputes concerning its work, the Mission had to move from its first office in the 
building of the Estonian Foreign Ministry and has been located since then in a small 
                                                        
 
6
 The same is true for the mandate of the HCNM who stressed several times that his office is not one 
“for” national minorities but “on” these groups. 
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house in the old part of town.  The annual budget is about 7 million ATS (1999) for 
operative costs.  The diplomats’ salaries are directly paid by the seconding countries. 
The activities of the Mission are guided by the mandate which is set for a period of six 
months.  However, the mandate has been prolonged every six months following a 
decision taken by the CSO  as well as by the “Article of Understanding” signed by the 
first HoM on 13 February 1993.  This article additionally regulates issues of security and 
freedom of movement of Mission members as well as their access to people, societal 
groups and representatives; it also covers their privileges and immunity.  Both documents 
are in force without any changes.  The mandate reads as follows: 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE OSCE MISSION TO ESTONIA
7
 
Objective of the Mission: The objective of the Mission is to promote stability, 
dialogue and understanding between the communities in Estonia. 
Mission Activities: To this end the Mission will: 
· establish and maintain contacts with competent authorities on both the national 
and the local level, in particular with those responsible for citizenship, migration, 
language questions, social services and employment; 
· establish and maintain contacts with relevant non-governmental institutions and 
organizations, including political parties, trade unions and mass media organizations; 
· collect information and serve as a clearing-house for information, technical 
assistance and advice on matters relating to the status of the communities in Estonia 
and the rights and duties of their members; 
· contribute to the efforts of Estonian national and local authorities to recreate a 
civic society, inter alia through the promotion of local mechanism to facilitate 
dialogue and understanding; 
· keeping in mind the temporary nature of the Mission, consider ways and means of 
transferring its responsibilities to institutions or organizations representing the local 
population. 
In its work the Mission will take into account the findings of the CSCE/ODIHR 
Mission to Estonia.  
Size and Composition: The Mission will number initially six members. All 
participating States are eligible to participate in the Mission.  
Mission Area: The Mission will operate in the whole territory of the Republic of 
Estonia, but its activities will focus on the northern and north-eastern parts of the 
                                                        
 
7
 CSCE/l9-CSO/Journal No. 2 / Annex 1. 
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country. The Mission will establish its headquarters in Tallinn and other offices in 
Narva and Kohtla-Järve.  
Co-ordination: The Mission will exchange information and co-operate on relevant 
questions with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and, in 
questions falling within his competence, with the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities. 
The Mission will exchange information and co-ordinate, as necessary, with re-
presentatives of the United Nations, of other international organizations and of 
CSCE participating States in Estonia. 
Reports: The Head of Mission will submit regular reports to the Chairman-in-Office. 
Conditions of Service: Provisions ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of 
the members of the Mission, access to the local population, communities and 
authorities, privileges and immunities will be included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding to be signed by the Head of Mission and the Government of Estonia. 
Duration and Review Procedures: The Mission will operate for a period of six 
months. The operation, duration and other modalities of the Mission will be 
reviewed, as the appropriate, by the Committee of Senior Officials. 
 
In late 1994, the Mission’s staff was complemented by the “OSCE Representative to the 
Estonian Government Commission”— a position created during the negotiations on the 
withdrawal of Russian troops when Estonia had to agree to allow 20,000 Russian 
military pensioners to apply for residence permits and social guarantees.  The Estonian 
government, relating this number to the figures of its own small military forces, insisted 
that the pensioners represented a threat to Estonia’s security and demanded that resident 
permits be delivered only after each candidate had been examined.  Russia accepted this 
request but demanded international observation of the examinations.  In turn, Estonia 
demanded that a German expert with special knowledge of the former Soviet military 
forces act as the observer.  Finally, on 26 July 1994, the agreement on “Matters Related 
to Social Guarantees for Military Pensioners of the Russian Federation on the Territory 
of the Republic of Estonia” was signed.  It says again that the office of the OSCE 
Representative was established “on the request of Estonia”.  The duty of the OSCE 
Representative, who started his work in November 1994, is to participate in the work of 
the Estonian Government Commission, to make recommendations concerning the 
granting of residence permits and to inform the CiO on the work of the Commission.  
The Representative is supported by an Estonian assistant.  The office is not subordinated 
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to the HoM and has its own budget (ca. 1.7 ATS in 1998).  The intensity of the informal 
co-operation between the two offices depends on the HoM in office and the 
Representative’s decisions.  Sometimes the Representative and/or his assistant participate 
in the working meetings of the Mission and in some NGO projects (see below).  
Occasionally, the assistant is also sent to implementation meetings organised by the 
ODIHR and whose purpose is to review implementation of “human dimension” 
agreements by OSCE participating States.  
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III. THE MISSION’S TEAM AND HIERARCHY  
The Mission is composed of individuals with different cultural origins, qualifications, 
social situations and political backgrounds.  Each OSCE participating State can send 
personnel and change of diplomats occurs frequently.
8
  Mission members must stay for at 
least six months and they may prolong their contracts if the HoM agrees and if a longer 
stay is preferred by the OSCE.  As a rule, the commitment is prolonged two or three 
times; however, some diplomats stay up to three years.  As regards their personal 
capacity to plan, the perspective is short-term.  Thus, the profile of the Mission is 
heterogeneous and changes continuously.  The first two HoMs, Klaus Törnudd and 
Timo Lahelma, were from Finland.  They were succeeded by Richard Samuels (UK), 
Herbert Grubmayr (Austria), Jean Perrin (France), Detlof von Berg (Germany), and, 
since October 1998, Bernd Braun (Germany).  About 20 diplomats from six countries 
have worked in the staff since the beginning and there is still a strong German and 
Finnish contingency. 
In August 1998, the Mission was composed of Detlof von Berg, who was HoM in 
Tirana before then and left Estonia the same year to take up the post of German 
Ambassador to Lithuania.  Lt. Col. Christian Bistrup from Denmark was just taking up 
the post of Deputy HoM, relieving the most senior member of staff, Kai Niels 
Willadsen,
9
 likewise commissioned by the Danish military forces.  Furthermore, the staff 
had three First Secretaries: Markus Galdia, an experienced advocate (again from 
Germany), Sari Kantola, a Finnish economist, as well as Anna Westerholm, a Swede with 
a political science background and NGO experience.  New within the staff was a scholar 
of jurisprudence Neil Brennan who was hired as Second Secretary.  Before joining the 
Mission, he had been teaching international law and human rights within the Open 
Society Programme at the University of Tartu, Estonia.  He took the initiative and 
applied directly at the Mission; this step helped make Canada second Mr. Brennan to a 
                                                        
 8 In the period between summer 1998 and 1999, every post (apart from the bookkeeper’s) was 
replaced and the share of women declined. 
 9 After he left, he returned to Tallinn and became a member of the Delegation to the European 
Commission. 
 
 
 
 
14
country where he already was.  The Mission further employed an Estonian driver and an 
Estonian secretary (Hedi Kolk) who had worked with the Mission since the beginning 
until she was dismissed in summer 1999.  Another Estonian, Eve Kuusmann, is employed 
part-time for bookkeeping but originally taught Estonian foreign affairs and was 
responsible for project management at the Centre for Democratic Studies at the Tallinn 
Pedagogical University.  The office of the OSCE Representative is headed by the 
German Uwe Mahrenholtz, a former military attaché in Moscow, and now a pensioner.  
His assistant Tiina Ilsen, again, is Estonian. 
The mandate as well as the hierarchical diplomatic tradition places implementation of the 
mandate to a large extent into the hands of the HoM.  In August 1998, the situation was 
characterised by a relatively liberal management style of the then HoM.  Every Monday 
morning the diplomats came together for a working meeting of about two hours.  It 
served to inform about new developments, to distribute and coordinate duties and to 
discuss issues which are disputed among Mission members.  All of them appreciated the 
freedom to act on their own, granted to them by the OSCE headquarters in Vienna as 
well as by the then HoM.  
The heterogeneous composition of the personnel is supportive of the broad range of the 
Mission’s duties.  This, however, also means that its members are not of one mind  
regarding central issues of their work.  The mandate, for example, calls for support for 
‘civil society’ in Estonia but nearly every member of the staff has his/her own 
understanding of what is meant by this term.  Different political cultures, a broad range 
of very diverse activities, life in an intellectually poor environment where everybody 
knows and mistrusts everybody, and where every Mission member must suspect his 
colleagues not only in order to realise the common declared goal of serving the OSCE, 
but also to provide the commissioning government with a particular kind of ‘secondary 
reports’— all these aspects cause emotional stress.  The diplomat’s opportunity for 
compensation— material or moral— is small.  Occasionally, while participating in 
international conferences, Mission members can find some appreciation which is denied 
them while working on the spot.  Compensation outside of work is difficult.  One reason 
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is the heavy workload,
10
 and again it depends on the HoM whether he helps make the 
situation bearable.  Another reason is that most Mission members are not accompanied 
by their families and have to live without close friendly social relations.
11
  Mission 
members become easy subjects of gossip and speculation, and there is not much left for 
them than to hope for their own carrier taking an upturn when their barren period in 
Estonia is over.  
Professional diplomats from different generations have to co-operate with persons who 
are more experienced with the NGO and human rights sector; these persons, it turn, must 
collaborate with persons formed by military service; and individuals who have received a 
traditional diplomatic education in history or jurisprudence, and who have never had 
access to electronic media, have to co-operate with those whose perspectives are 
influenced by the social sciences and who cannot live without the internet. When male 
diplomats from Germany encounter female diplomats from Scandinavian countries in 
small offices, one can expect social friction negatively affecting work as long as 
possibilities to reflect on the situation itself are poor.  One can observe these tensions 
most easily with respect to gender.  It is not a specificity of the Mission to Estonia that 
the hierarchy within the staff exhibits a well-known pattern: the Mission is headed by 
men; at the intermediate level, we find the male experts of law; and the female members 
of staff, educated in subjects beyond traditional diplomacy, are placed at the bottom.  
The existence of such a hierarchy is no secret.  One direct expression is rendered by the 
form of address: whereas the HoM is called “Mr. Ambassador”, the staff is called by 
forenames.  Female Mission members, however, are often referred to as “the girls” or 
even “the girlies”.  Although they express their discontent with this terminology which 
they perceive as discriminatory, the male staff smiles at them when they complain.  Male 
diplomats do not feel this form of address to be incorrect and perceive the term “girl” as 
                                                        
 10 “The work schedule of Mission personnel is determined by the HoM. There is no set eight-hour 
working day in any of the Missions. Frequent circumstances require that Mission personnel conduct 
duty activities in the evening and on weekends [...] in all instances, the completion of Mission 
objectives and local working conditions must prevail.” (OSCE personnel guidelines for seconded 
Mission staff 1).  
 11 “The OSCE discourages the accompaniment of dependants of seconded Mission members to the 
operational area.” (Administrative Instruction No. 4/98, 1 June 1998). 
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friendly.  The form of address is even more delicate when used during communications 
with visitors.  People outside the Mission tend to also adopt the address.  When they call 
a female diplomat a “girl”, her authority to act according to her rank of First Secretary is 
undermined.  This practice also intensifies the gender-specific division of labour within 
the Mission.  Whereas male diplomats are invited to participate in high-ranking events, to 
receive international visitors and to communicate with members of the political elite and 
state representatives, female diplomats are usually busy with the Russian-speaking 
population and NGO affairs and do not get to use their specialities, for instance in 
economic issues.  Their activities, which are also part of the mandate, are regarded as 
marginal by male diplomats.  The female staff members do not share this view and 
consider their work to be essential, albeit of low prestige.  They feel excluded from 
international contacts and related prospects for promotion and resent the fact that 
women have to do twice as much work and twice as well as men, without gaining due 
recognition for their efforts.  
When asking about core qualifications needed in order to run the Mission, one gets a 
female and a male answer.  The men at the top of the Mission’s hierarchy perceive the 
job as part of the routine range of diplomatic activities.  Knowledge in history and law 
matters, but most important to them is long-standing experience in diplomacy.  The idea 
of increased OSCE training in conflict prevention is looked at with scepticism.  In their 
opinion, training should remain a responsibility of the seconding country because this 
would better guarantee the quality of the diplomats’ education.  Male diplomats think 
that the present system, which includes only one day’s preparation in Vienna,
12
 provides 
sufficient knowledge for serving in a Mission.  Nonetheless, they support additional 
training on working together within an international team— a skill which is usually not 
part of a diplomat’s traditional training.  In the face of the increasing need for OSCE 
personnel and the fact that the OSCE is urged to accept every person proposed by a state 
                                                        
 12 “A one-day orientation program is offered in Vienna to assist new Mission members in beginning 
their assignment with the OSCE.  Upon arrival at the OSCE Secretariat, new Mission members will 
meet the Conflict Prevention Centre staff responsible for Mission support.  They will receive an 
overview of the OSCE and Secretariat personnel will respond to whatever question new Mission 
members may have [...]  Individuals who are to be assigned administrative duties in the Missions will 
receive a more extensive briefing concerning their area of responsibility.” (Personnel Guidelines for 
Seconded Mission Staff, section: “Orientation of OSCE Members”). 
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without further examination, they plea for better training of the fresh personnel streaming 
in.  
Female diplomats hold different ideas concerning qualifications needed.  They have 
participated in an OSCE training seminar in Vienna which they regret that their male 
colleagues never attended and wish that all Mission members were likewise prepared for 
their duties, including leading persons.  In the female view, staff members should 
primarily learn to operate within a multicultural environment inside the Mission as well as 
outside, to handle several difficult issues within a short period of time and in parallel, to 
act flexibly and upon one’s own initiative, and to work together with people under great 
emotional strain.  Willingness to travel around the country is a must.  Female diplomats 
would also like to see training for all the staff with respect to teamwork and “gender-
sensitivity training”.  In their view, the OSCE in Vienna should have more influence in 
the choice of the HoM and traditional trust in hierarchy should be replaced by trust in 
equality and professionalism.  
However, a need for training with respect to conflict management and conflict resolution 
was articulated neither by the male nor by the female staff.  Apparently, the  profile 
needed for diplomatic activities within a Mission is determined in a “masculine way”.  
Reservations against female personnel, feigned to be founded on negative experiences, 
are circulating.  Male diplomats fear emotional, passionate and rash female  colleagues, 
whose nerves might snap easily and who might weaken the Mission which should 
function as an “impregnable fortress”.  Former female staff members were blamed in a 
stereotypical way because of alleged severe “mistakes” which affected the Mission’s 
relations with the Estonian government.  Such incidents are known outside the Mission 
but not so much labelled as a failure of a female diplomat but rather as an indicator of the 
tenacity of Estonian politicians, always searching for an opportunity to criticise the 
Mission. 
Despite reservations against women in diplomatic functions, all Mission members as well 
as all interviewees answered affirmatively and in a politically correct fashion to the 
question of whether they could imagine a woman as HoM.  Most of them point to the 
office of the UNDP in Tallinn which is headed by the Swedish female diplomat Petra 
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Lantz-de Bernardis.  This general approval, however, has some reservations.  Male 
diplomats propose that a woman should take a leading position only when she knows her 
own limits and is prepared to hand duties over to a man if needed.  The degree of tension 
would also be of importance.  The more a conflict has already escalated into violent 
action, the more an OSCE mission would have to rely on military personnel, and the 
more difficult it would be for a woman to occupy a leading position.  So far, for all 
interviewees, Tallinn would be an ideal place to test a woman.
13
  Female diplomats 
hesitate to believe that the OSCE would ever appoint a female HoM, although they 
would welcome her with enthusiasm because they would expect a reduction of 
discrimination and hierarchy as well as a change of priorities in the Mission’s approach to 
fulfilling its mandate.  
                                                        
 13 At the time of publication, a woman was appointed Head of Mission in Tallinn.  She is the first 
woman to ever occupy the post of HoM in a OSCE Long-term mission. 
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IV. THE COMPREHENSION OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 
As outlined above, the understanding of the essence of the Mission’s duties and approach 
is not unified.  The concept of the Mission is predominantly designed towards addressing 
a specific situation in a country where dependable relationships between people are 
lacking and the fear of being treated unfairly determines the behaviour of all actors.  The 
Mission must cope with the fact that its presence was not welcomed by the state 
authorities and that the OSCE and the Mission are regarded as weak actors, even lacking 
the trust of the discriminated group.  The Mission cannot rely on the traditional insignia 
of might and power, i.e. military support, and has to struggle for authority, recognition 
and self-recognition.  Often, the strategy even forbids it to justify its activities and 
demands that the Mission does not react against criticism or show any emotions.  Thus, 
the Mission also has to protect itself in order not to be anybody’s fool and must play 
tricky games in order to be accepted by various actors as a reliable partner with an 
outstanding knowledge of developments in the country.  It must show flexibility and 
avoid rigid positions without risking losing control.  There is little space for kindness, 
warmth, humour, self-irony and self-reliance of the Mission itself.  This burdens the 
working climate, which is further negatively affected by another factor unknown in other 
organisations: the positive results of the Mission’s work will only be known in 
retrospect; even when certain achievements are obvious, they can hardly be celebrated. 
Most Mission members follow a traditional, pre-democratic understanding of 
international politics when describing the Mission’s duties.  In this view, the OSCE is 
seen as an instrument of foreign policy, functioning like a permanent “Vienna Congress” 
exempt from the demands of democratic participation and control.  Less than for the 
military (which is in need of public support in order to obtain resources), publicity counts 
positively for institutions carrying out preventive diplomacy.  The Mission finds itself 
subordinated to the CSO in Vienna and is only responsible to this organ.  The diplomats 
believe that the OSCE, including its conflict prevention sector, is not in need of any kind 
of public affirmation but of goodwill only.  The less the public is involved, the better the 
OSCE is expected to function.  Preventive diplomacy is perceived as a form of security 
policy, in contrast to human rights policy.  Mission members also emphasise that even 
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the complaining Russian-speaking population is not interested in human rights but solely 
in the amelioration of its day-to-day life.  Neither its representatives nor the Mission 
members believe in the statement made by the participating States in the CSCE Paris 
Charter that security, democracy and human rights ought to form a whole.
14
  Instead, 
one propagates a concept which says that, in principle, states do not promote human 
rights as an end but as a means of serving their particular national interests  
According to this philosophy, the Mission’s priority is to defuse existing tensions.  The 
search for solutions is allocated to second rank.  Comfort is seen as the primary goal of 
the OSCE, of the member states as well of the people of Estonia.  The common aim 
seems to be to create a state of quietude and to avoid disputes of any kind on the 
international level (between Estonia and Russia and other states belonging to the OSCE, 
European Union or NATO).  This also applies to domestic developments in Estonia as 
well as to the Mission itself and its relationship towards the Estonian State.  In its own 
presentation, it is not a critical institution but one characterised by the intent to collect 
and distribute material and moral resources (money and books as well as moral support 
and attention) and by the aim to create an atmosphere of improved co-operation among 
all actors.  In order to avoid confrontations with the Estonian government and, at the 
same time, to influence it by pointing to the real needs in the country, the Mission chose 
a strategy of “active conformation”.  This strategy is composed of a semi-public part and 
a more secret, behind-the-scenes part.  The two components of the strategy are used 
together to achieve the overall aim of influencing the Estonian government. 
In public, the Mission neither plays a mediator’s role between the Estonian State and the 
Russian-speaking minority nor does it act as its agent.  Rather, the Mission backs the 
Estonian government to a large degree, varying according to the HoM in office and to 
the issue under discussion.  Public statements are made only when it has been 
internationally agreed that developments in law-making are definitely in violation of 
international law.  This was the case with the amendments to the language law in 1999 
                                                        
 
14 The Charter reads, for example: “We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security 
among our States, the advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of human 
rights, are indispensable” (Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted at the CSCE Summit, Paris, 
21 November 1990). 
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that sought to impose a requirement for all persons working with the public, including 
private businesses and NGOs, to be able to speak Estonian.  The then HoM was cited in 
the press as having said that the organisation does not object to language regulations in 
the areas of consumer protection, public safety and security, but that it objected to some 
of the provisions in the Estonian amendments which go further than international law 
would allow.  “If they want to be part of European institutions then they need to play by 
their rules and follow international standards.”
15  
Such clear communication has been rare.  Even when Mission members attend 
international seminars, they protect the government against criticism expressed for 
instance by NGO participants who demand that more attention be paid to human rights 
and to dialogue.  Mission members do not participate as partners in the dialogue;  
instead, they play the role of observer (some people say “Big Brother”).  They only ask 
to speak when arguments or disgruntlement seriously challenge the official Estonian 
position.  During breaks, Mission members act more sharply.  They use informal speech 
to react to attacks which had been unfairly directed against representatives of Russian-
speakers or to ask foreign participants to behave in a responsible manner and not to 
disrupt the process of dialogue with unpleasant statements. 
With disregard for the vulnerability of the discriminated minority, the Mission supports 
the government’s ideological positions, particularly with regard to citizenship and 
language, although Mission members, at the same time, work hard for change and 
dialogue.  Mission members describe the conflict in nearly the same way the Estonian 
government does and accept its phrasing, thereby insinuating, for instance, that the 
country is experiencing no tensions, no human right violations and that there is even no 
Russian-speaking minority.
16
  They accept the vague term of “integration” as the ultimate 
aim, and even support it with clichés pretending that ethnic Estonians and ethnic 
Russians in Estonia live in two different worlds and that Russians should integrate into 
the Estonian world and assimilate.  They ignore the fact that Estonian society consists of 
                                                        
 15 BT 8-14 July 1999. 
 
16 Indeed the term is difficult because Russian-speakers consist of several ethnic groups, each of them 
being in a minority position. 
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Estonians and Russians.  Another cliché is that Russians in Estonia are a lethargic group 
of post-Soviet people, thereby implying that Estonians represents a modern, free world.  
Some Mission members even call non-citizens “occupants” and blame them for being 
emotional and passive at the same time.  The Mission abstains from any frank comments 
and glosses over crisis-prone developments in the country, reporting solely on positive 
events.  Contrary to practice during the first years, the Mission today abstains even from 
formulating recommendations directly. 
The Mission also considers the objections against its presence raised by the Estonian 
State.  Estonian representatives, for example, have claimed that the presence of the 
Mission might scare away foreign investors.  Correspondingly, the Mission makes itself 
invisible and abstains from displaying a flag or even a nameplate outside the office.  To 
the argument that the Mission could hinder Estonia’s efforts to join the EU, the Mission 
responds by demonstrating that its activities are helpful in securing EU resources and in 
convincing the EU of Estonia’s willingness to qualify for membership.  (For the 
Mission’s position on EU-related issues, see Chapter V.2). 
In exchange for its support for the views of the Estonian government, the Mission 
expects the State to make concessions to non-citizens.  Occasionally, reports are drafted 
saying that the Government has behaved in a liberal and rather generous fashion towards 
non-citizens on certain issues.  The draft is communicated to the Government  which can 
thereby find out about the Mission’s expectations.  If the Government then behaves as 
expected, the Mission publishes the information, thereby helping to improve the image of 
the country abroad.  This method works, but not always.  If the Government does not 
react to the draft, then nothing is reported and the Mission looks again for further 
opportunities to motivate the Government to change its position.  
This moderate strategy also applies to issues of human rights and minority rights.  
“Active conformation” with the Estonian State may also be used to describe the 
approach of searching for means acceptable to the Estonian political class of dealing with 
the fate of the Russian-speaking minority.  This is generally placed on the agenda not as a 
human rights matter, but at least as part of the OSCE ‘human dimension basket’, in order 
to create the awareness that the integration of non-citizens is really an Estonian problem 
 
 
 
23
and cannot be dismissed as Russian rhetoric.  Although shying away from placing human 
rights issues on the agenda, the Mission occasionally cannot escape  from the dynamics 
of this discourse.  The Mission must address human rights issues either in cases when a 
state expects the Mission to raise human rights questions or in cases when the Mission 
has received a warning that an NGO will make human rights issues a central subject.  In 
those cases, the Mission seeks to demonstrate that it is prepared.  In other words, its 
orientation towards human rights issues depends not on the needs of the vulnerable 
group but on the possibility that an actor— governmental or non-governmental— is able 
and willing to politicise human rights violations.  
When the Mission cannot avoid dealing with human rights issues, it understands its 
function as an instrument for allocating the struggle for human rights rather than 
overseeing their implementation.  The Mission’s duty is to prepare for tensions which 
might derive from human rights disputes and to contribute to the ability of OSCE 
institutions to tackle the situation.  For this purpose, it delegates the human rights issue 
as much as possible to appropriate OSCE bodies better designed to address the Estonian 
government concerning its commitments to human rights standards.  It will also assist 
this institution or person— usually the HCNM and his office— with a substantial part of 
the work, for instance by preparing a legal opinion.  Two cases which were topical in 
August 1998 serve to illustrate how the Mission handles human rights related disputes.  
The first one concerns Estonia’s religious policy.  Estonia is afraid of the Orthodox 
Church as a Russian basis for destabilising the state and therefore wants to foil links 
between the Orthodox Church in Estonia (which owns a lot of property) and the 
Orthodox Church in Russia.  Thus, the Estonian government promoted the incorporation 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia into the patriarchy of Constantinople.  This is 
presumably not only against canon law, but also against the freedom of religion of the 
majority of about 50,000 Orthodox believers.  The Mission was prepared to provide its 
mediation offices, but remained cautiously in the background.  The Estonian Archbishop 
Korniliy (who belongs to the Moscow patriarchy) turned towards the HCNM and the 
Mission.  After Orthodox believers organised several demonstrations, the HoM 
contacted the Archbishop as well as the Russian embassy in order to test its willingness 
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to politicise the issue and to prevent such a development.  The Russian ambassador gave 
a signal that Russia was not interested in seeing the issue become a central point of the 
Mission’s work.  One can conclude from this that, as long as Russia is not interested, 
and/or as long as the Orthodox believers do not mobilise the necessary resources to enlist 
the international audience in the defence of their rights, freedom of religion in Estonia 
will not become topical in the Mission’s dialogue with the Estonian government, 
although from an objective point of view it is a matter of human rights.  
A second case concerns Estonian limitations on the freedom of expression.  Non-citizens 
in Estonia are free to associate; however, public demonstrations must be officially 
approved and are only allowed after an Estonian citizen has accepted responsibility for it.  
During summer 1998, the “Union of Russian citizens” in Estonia and the “Union of 
Russian Pensioners” contravened this law and some participants were arrested.  This was 
definitely a violation of human rights— even according to Mission members.
17
 In this 
case, the Mission decided to deal with this issue actively.  One reason behind this 
decision was that such arrests could be repeated and could thereby cause legal 
proceedings and political unrest.  Another reason was the Mission’s fear of certain NGOs 
who could make these violations an issue during a forthcoming ODIHR implementation 
meeting on human dimension issues and blame the Mission for idleness.  Whether and 
how the issue would come up could not be predicted.  Again, the Mission avoided direct 
confrontation with the Estonian government and abstained from making any public 
statements.  Instead, it pursued a silent strategy: it prepared a legal opinion and 
communicated intensively with the office of the HCNM in order to let him, not the 
Mission, comment on the arrests as a violation of human rights commitments.  Further, 
the Mission preferred that the HCNM hand over the legal opinion— enriched by 
diplomatic niceties— to the Estonian government.   
                                                        
 17 CBSS Commissioner, 1998. 
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V. THE MISSION’S FIELDS OF ACTIVITY 
If one has in mind how small the staff is and how complex its working conditions are, 
one will note that the Mission’s performance, as described below, is impressive.  
Whereas the Mission had initially focused on the laws related to citizenship, statelessness 
and residence permits, its field of action has become much broader and includes the 
collection of information, reporting, international coordination, advice to state 
institutions, mediation during political crises, as well as duties related to socio-political 
projects.  All these activities are meshed together and are part of an overall concept, but 
they are of different weight.  The more important the activity is for the Mission, the more 
it is concealed from the public eye.  
 
1. Collecting information and reporting 
Almost all of the Mission’s activities are based on its core capacity to collect and 
communicate information.  Mission members are proud of being better informed about 
Estonia and the Estonian northeast than any other national or international organisation.  
The Mission produces different types of reports: Activity Reports, Spot Reports, 
Background Reports, Surveys, Internal Memos and other documents such as the reports 
of the OSCE Representative to the CiO.  None of these reports are available to the 
public; their confidentiality, however, varies.  
Contrary to the Activity Reports, the Spot Reports on incidents and early warning react 
to certain crisis situations; they are not prepared regularly, but fairly often.  Background 
Reports, on the contrary, are rare.  In August 1998, a socio-political Background Report 
of more than a hundred pages, entitled “Aspects of integration - Report of the OSCE 
Mission to Estonia” was completed following an initiative of the then HoM.  He had 
originally asked the two female diplomats at the Mission to report on social-political 
developments in Ida-Virumaa county but, in the end, most of the staff had become 
involved and was quite exhausted.  A survey was now at hand, including chapters on 
civil society developments, the role of NGOs and mass media, education and language 
policy, migration, citizenship, ethnic minorities, inter-ethnic relations, socio-economic 
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factors of integration, social stratification, unemployment, and the role of regional 
development.  The aim of this survey was to contribute to a better understanding of the 
magnitude of the issues to be tackled within the integration process.  The survey was 
communicated to the Estonian government as well as to OSCE headquarters in Vienna. 
Even in Vienna this survey can be studied neither by the public, nor by government 
representatives, nor by experts for the simple reason that it has apparently disappeared 
from the files in a mysterious way.  Rumours say that the Estonian government did not 
like its contents and sent a person to steal it from the archives.   
As already mentioned, the Mission also prepares Legal Opinions which concentrate on 
international law and often touch upon human rights issues.  They are particularly 
relevant in the communication between the Mission, the HCNM and the Estonian 
government and, occasionally, they are labelled as Background Reports and also 
forwarded to Vienna.  
About twice a month, the Mission prepares so-called Activity Reports of three to seven 
pages.  Signed by the HoM, they are communicated to the CiO, the Conflict Prevention 
Centre (CPC) in Vienna and to the HCNM in The Hague.  The Mission further sends 
these reports to selected institutions on-site: the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Commission, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Nationality Relations, the Ministry of Education, the Office of the President,  the 
embassies of OSCE member states in Tallinn, the Delegation of the European 
Commission and the Tallinn UNDP office.  Although these reports are not available to 
the public, they are not secret either.  They are transmitted semi-officially by the 
governmental recipients to selected persons.  Thus, their contents may be known 
informally.  But it is more difficult for representatives of the Russian-speaking 
community to gain access to these reports than for groups which are on friendlier terms 
with the Estonian State. 
Explanations given for the mystery behind the Mission’s Activity Reports sound more 
like excuses.  The HoM finds it common sense that reports are not distributed although it 
is not forbidden to circulate them outside the Mission.  Indeed, the mandate does not 
mention any limitations for distribution.  Other Mission members point to the fact that, 
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according to the mandate, their duty is to report to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO), 
to representatives of the United Nations, of other international organisations and of the 
OSCE participating States in Estonia— and to no-one else.  Nobody would expect a 
government to share all its information with the public and the same should be clear 
regarding the OSCE because of its governmental nature.  The Mission was mandated to 
serve as a “clearing-house” for the purpose of member states only, and not for NGOs.  
They can obtain sufficient information from other sources and may even participate in 
various OSCE conferences.  As to the people of Estonia, they already know the situation 
in the country and should not need to study OSCE reports.  Finally, Mission members 
explain that reports are part of “silent diplomacy” and have been written in a specific 
diplomatic language not understandable to the general public.  
It is rather unlikely, however, that it was the Mission’s free decision to withhold 
information on such a strict basis for two reasons: firstly, it had exercised a less 
restrictive information policy in the beginning when it was headed by Finnish diplomats; 
secondly, the Estonian government had complained about the reports in order to criticise 
the Mission’s work.  In one case, the continued presence of the Mission was put in 
jeopardy after the authors of an Activity Report had cited a local news item on the Red 
Army in 1944 and had inadvertently used the term “liberation” (instead of “occupation”) 
without putting it into quotation marks (Lahelma 1999: 33).  It took months before 
relations with the Government were back on track.  Also, after the Mission had reported 
on the bureaucratic handling of the Estonian laws on foreigners during 1993 and 1994, 
and pointed to protracted procedures for issuing residence permits for non-citizens, the 
Estonian government complained directly to the CiO.  As a result, the then HoM, Timo 
Lahelma from Finland, was replaced by Richard Samuels from the United Kingdom, and 
tensions between the Estonian government and the Mission calmed down.  It is presumed 
that an arrangement was made at that time between the Mission and the Estonian and 
Russian governments on the distribution of reports, and that the Estonian government 
won a controlling function.  Since then, the Estonian government sees the reports before 
they are communicated to the institutions mentioned above.
18
  Whether this practice 
                                                        
 18 This is not the case with the reports of the OSCE Representative, which are officially submitted 
neither to the Estonian nor to the Russian government, but only to the CiO.  The fact that both 
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made sense was not clear, even to Mission members, and it subsequently changed, in late 
1998, after the HoM Detlof von Berg left. 
The nature of the Activity Reports has also changed since that time.  Whereas they used 
to contain substantial information on inter-Estonian disputes and on international 
expectations towards the country, they have now turned into reports on undisputed 
issues only.  The different nature of the reports concurs with their changed function 
within the strategy of preventive diplomacy.  Thus, the activity reports, which were 
originally meant to inform the international community substantially and objectively on 
the development of tensions, today hardly indicate that any tensions worthy of 
international attention exist in Estonia.  The preparation of reports is ruled instead by the 
following guidelines: they should not contain anything which has the potential to nourish 
tensions between Estonia and Russia and which could be used by one to strengthen its 
arguments against the other.  Above all, they should not give any pretexts to the 
Estonian government to complain.  Priority is given to satisfying the Estonian interest in 
a polished image in Europe.  The reports are meant to contribute to opening a channel 
for Estonia to be perceived as a country that is prepared for joining Europe because of 
generous concessions towards non-citizens.  Reports are further intended to inform 
about projects, to motivate sponsors to continue their support as well as to contribute to 
finding emulating actors.  Finally, reports must clearly show that the Mission is not 
twiddling its thumbs.  Although these reports are nearly unanimously judged to be of 
little substance by persons familiar with their contents, they are perceived as an 
opportunity to attract attention from abroad to Estonian affairs.  Estonian politicians also 
appreciate the reports as examples of how tensions can be resolved by a change of 
language and how even a small state can defend itself against heavy attacks from a 
superpower like Russia.  
The change in the nature and function of the activity reports may have contributed to 
increased acceptance of the Mission’s presence in Estonia.  It may also have helped to 
protect it against arguments questioning the usefulness of this instrument and motivated 
the Estonian government to follow international expectations— at least in a few 
                                                                                                                                                                  
governments know about the contents on an informal basis is not seen as a problem, because 
governments do not refer to unofficial information to make them the issue of disputes.  
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instances.  But this approach bears a price.  It is a loss from the perspective of the quality 
of international information on the conflict.  Representatives of human rights groups 
qualify the Activity Reports— as far as they have access to them— as misleading or 
irrelevant.  Some Mission members even find that reporting is neither objective nor 
neutral and that it has become a weak instrument.  
2. Serving international actors as a “clearing house” 
The mandate defines the role of a Mission as a “clearing house for information, technical 
assistance and advice.”  Whatever the term “clearing house” really means, one of its 
functions is to serve the OSCE and other international actors involved in Estonian affairs, 
and to dissipate doubts on how to act.  Thus, the Mission is given a co-ordinating 
capacity as part of a good governance regime for Estonia.  The Mission contributes to 
the balance of different interests of OSCE member states and makes sure that their 
actions do not run against the general aim of conflict prevention.  This co-ordinating 
capacity has become increasingly important since the early nineties when international 
presence in Estonia, beginning with foreign embassies, international organisations and 
projects, has multiplied and channelled political and financial resources into Estonia.  At 
least five dimensions of these co-ordinating functions may be distinguished. 
i. The Mission primarily lives up to the expectations of OSCE member states.  One 
diplomat has explained this duty as follows: membership in the OSCE costs states a 
lot.  Thus, the Mission cannot serve Estonia’s interests only but must meet the 
interests of all these states who expect to get in return an equivalent of OSCE 
membership costs.  The second HoM, Timo Lahelma, wrote that the Mission’s work 
is valuable for OSCE states in the formulation of their foreign policy with respect to 
the Baltic region (Lahelma 1994: 99).  Russian diplomats explained that the Mission 
is appreciated for three reasons: firstly, it demonstrates that Estonia must not only 
consider West European interests but also keep in mind Russian interests; secondly, 
it bridges the communication gap between the Estonian government and the Russian 
Embassy in Tallinn; and, thirdly, it also creates space for Russian diplomats to 
somehow distance themselves from rhetoric and propaganda at the centre in 
Moscow which tends to withhold relevant information. 
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ii. Furthermore, the Mission is an instrument of the OSCE’s primary goal of ensuring 
stability within the all-European region for a good price.  According to Mission 
members, this is achieved in the case of Estonia as long the Organisation is not 
confronted with severe disputes on Estonian affairs.  In this sense, the Mission has 
been outstandingly successful.  According to observers, the Mission reports 
submitted to the OSCE in Vienna are given the nod after a few statements reeled off 
in a stereotypical pattern: a representative of the USA demands increased emphasis 
on human rights, then a representative of a West European state recalls the need to 
understand the Estonian position and the Estonian search for security; then the 
Russian representative steps in and claims more attention for the situation of the 
Russian-speaking minority; finally, the Estonian representative states that Estonia 
has fulfilled all of its international expectations regarding Russian-speakers and that 
all problems have already been resolved.  After this ritual, the debate on the report is 
over and the Mission can resume its work. 
iii. Together with other OSCE institutions, the Mission is an instrument for containing 
disputes that appear on the international scene, and for demanding that problems are 
solved where they have their roots, i.e. on the domestic level.  Communication with 
the office of the HCNM is intensive.  Conversely, the Mission also benefits from his 
activities and his recommendations which “provide guidelines for the work of the 
Mission (Lahelma, 1999: 26).”  Telephone calls between the two offices are made 
nearly every day in order to fathom which issues are to be raised, by whom, how and 
when.  One can hardly imagine how the office of the HCNM Max van der Stoel 
could have prepared those qualified statements which earned him high recognition 
even among human rights groups if he had not had access to the Mission’s detailed 
insight into law-making and legal policy in Estonia.  
iv. Communication between the Mission and ODIHR is comparatively under-
developed.  One reason for this is that consensus-making on the role of ODIHR and 
the “Human Dimension” within the OSCE security concept has remained poor in 
practice (Bloed 1997: 51-52).  For whatever reasons, the Mission shies away from 
ODIHR implementation meetings, which might interfere with the Mission’s plans.  
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Nonetheless, it cannot entirely escape from these debates; thus, in coordination with 
the office of the HCNM, it prepares for the eventuality that a question is raised on 
why Estonia has still not met international requirements to create an ombudsman 
institution or in case an NGO asks the Mission for an opinion on a human rights 
question (for example, regarding the treatment of Roma in Estonia).  Official 
communication with the CBSS “Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, including the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities”
19
 and with 
the UNDP office in Tallinn also seems to be under-developed.  In both cases, 
contacts are not free from rivalry and depend to a high degree on personal contacts, 
preferences and the national origin of the seconded diplomats. 
v. The Mission further seeks to use the self-interest of other international actors, and 
particularly of Estonia’s Nordic neighbours, in order to mobilise financial resources 
for certain projects for the benefit of the Russian-speaking population, such as 
printing and issuing of aliens’ passports, financing of English language courses for 
Russian-speakers as well as certain socio-political NGO projects (see below).  At the 
same time, the Mission must seek to give its search for foreign financing a broad 
basis in order to balance the impact of money-spending programmes of the EU or 
other institutions in which Estonia has a veto, as is the case in the CoE.  The 
Mission was repeatedly able, for instance, to convince the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) to finance projects supporting the integration of non-citizens 
who had been politically excluded by Estonian funding institutions and who had not 
obtained financial support from the CoE for the same reasons.  
vi. Finally, the Mission contributes to binding international actors to the OSCE’s 
approach to conflict prevention.  The OSCE was successful in linking the EU’s view 
on Estonian affairs to the OSCE approach.  The European Commission, which used 
to be rather indifferent to democracy and minority issues, was motivated to consider 
EU enlargement policy not solely according to economic criteria.  Without the 
Mission’s various activities, including information for members of the European 
                                                        
 
19 One of the advantages of the Commissioner is that he is explicitly entitled by his mandate to act on 
individual cases.  Thus, mission members have helped forward complicated cases to his office. 
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Parliament, the EU Commission would hardly have connected its decision to accept 
Estonia as a candidate to the insistence that Estonia intensify its efforts to integrate 
the Russian-speaking minority.  The fact that the EU recognised minority-related 
problems in Estonia in the first place is linked to the OSCE as well.  On the one 
hand, EU expectations concerning an Estonian integration policy is very much 
influenced by West European problems and competes with OSCE standards to some 
extent.  Project support from the EU for democratisation and civil society is 
comparatively poor.  With respect to the human dimension, the priority of the EU 
for Estonia is instead dominated by projects related to promoting Estonian language 
skills (Raik 1998: 85-91).  Here, too, lies the priority of the Estonian government’s 
Integration Strategy, which is accused of aiming at assimilation and which, on the 
quiet, is valued by experts inside and outside the Mission as “unrealistic” and “a 
waste of international money” (Järve and Wellmann 1999: 11-16 and 28-31).  At the 
same time, Estonian politicians play off the EU’s approach (as well as the rather 
similar approach of the UNDP which is mostly financed by the Nordic States
20
) 
against the approach of the OSCE.  They also use the involvement of the EU as an 
additional reason for closing down the Mission in Tallinn, which is said to be 
superfluous because the EU (or the UNDP) could better meet the Estonian need for 
integration.  A core activity of the Mission in the foreseeable future will still be to 
motivate the EU and the Nordic States to be really serious about domestic 
developments in Estonia and the social situation of the Russian-speaking minority.  
 
3. Advising Estonian state institutions 
What is outstanding is the OSCE’s closeness to selected institutions of the Estonian 
state, namely the Roundtable on National Minorities at the Presidential office, the 
                                                        
 20 The UNDP/Nordic Support to the Estonian State Integration Programme, 1998-2001, is USD 
1,350,000; Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland alone pay 980,000 USD. Co-operation between 
the Mission and the UNDP in Estonia is not close and one gets the impression that, as much as the 
UNDP is blind regarding policy of power, then the OSCE is equally blind with respect to 
development policy.  (In 1998, however, the diplomats started to work more intensively on the 
economy, the energy sector, regional development and social consequences in areas with high 
concentration of Russian-speakers.) 
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Roundtable of National Organisations in Ida-Virumaa County, the Constitutional 
Committee of the Parliament, and the Government Commission on Military Pensioners. 
In co-operating with these institutions, the Mission finds the opportunity to feed 
politicians with relevant information drawn from its own experience in the country as 
well as from various reports written by domestic experts together with foreign institutes 
and financed by foreign donors.  This includes information on recent developments in 
international law and the meaning of “sovereignty” at the end of the twentieth century, as 
well as statistics on demographic and social development— all in all information which 
most Estonian politicians dislike and neglect.  The Mission’s collaboration with these 
institutions grants it a wealth of information on the internal Estonian debate.  But it also 
confers upon the Mission responsibilities beyond what is usually expected in the case of 
an international organisation with a monitoring or consultative role. 
The Mission has not confined itself to observing the issuing of residence permits to non-
citizens and the examinations in the Estonian language, history and culture which are 
decreed as preconditions for naturalisation; it has also played more active roles.  During 
the preliminary campaign for local elections in October 1993, the Mission advertised in 
Estonian- and Russian-language newspapers an appeal to non-citizens to register 
according to the Estonian law on foreigners.  This would guarantee their right to vote in 
the local elections.  As registration of some 400,000 persons (nearly one third of the 
inhabitants) was— intentionally or not— placing a strain on bureaucracy, the Mission 
organised additional forces from the Nordic countries and financial support from other 
sources to enable the Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board to cope with the job.  
Paradoxically, the Mission thereby supported both increased participation of non-citizens 
in local affairs and, at the same time, the reinforcement of structural discriminations 
against this group.  Because Estonian law grants only voting rights but not eligibility for 
office to non-citizens, there was a lack of candidates who could mobilise Russian-
speaking non-citizen voters.  The Estonian State therefore decided on short notice to 
selectively grant citizenship to certain moderate Russian-speaking non-citizens who were 
expected to run as candidates in the elections.  The Mission, together with several 
Tallinn-based embassies of OSCE states, participated in the search for such candidates, 
again as an observer.  The then HoM Timo Lahelma commented on this: “One may, 
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admittedly, have misgivings about how well such a selection of candidates conforms to 
normal democratic practices.”  He however added that the “policy adopted by the 
government proved successful in the extraordinary circumstances which prevailed in 
which the legitimacy of the local elections was called into question.  There is no doubt 
that the new municipal councils elected last autumn for the most part reflect the ethnic 
structure of the communities (Lahelma 1994: 90).” 
 
The Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities emerged in the course of 
discussions between members of the “Representative Assembly of Non-citizens” and 
members of the Estonian government.  It was strongly encouraged by the US embassy 
together with the HCNM and the then HoM Timo Lahelma, and was finally established 
by President Meri in July 1993 at the height of the crisis on the Aliens Law.  He stated in 
a communiqué on 25 June 1993 that the Roundtable will present the conclusions of the 
participants’ discussions with the President in written form.  “Depending on the nature of 
each problem, the President of the Republic will forward them for examination to the 
Council of Europe, the CSCE, the Riigikogu, or for settlement by the pertinent state 
bodies (Lahelma 1999: 30).”  Earlier, the statutes of the Roundtable had been composed 
by three persons: a representative of the Russian-speakers, a representative from the 
“Estonian Union on National Minorities” and Timo Lahelma.  Later, the Mission acted as 
a permanent observer and legal adviser.  It also made suggestions on how to improve the 
working structures of this “standing conference” consisting of 17 members appointed by 
the President.  Until March 1995, when six Russian-speaking Estonian citizens were 
finally elected to Parliament, the Roundtable was the only political institution for the 
Russian-speaking community to express its needs.  However, it lost political weight 
continuously because it could influence neither the government nor Parliament, nor the 
President.  In 1997, Timo Lahelma (then already HoM out of office) confessed:  
“The round-table has, beyond doubt, proven its usefulness as an instrument of 
institutionalised dialogue. Nevertheless, I would have wished that the 
recommendations of the round-table would have gained more prominence in the 
media and in the public debate.  Also, while recognising the legal difficulties 
involved, I would also have expected a greater willingness on the part of Parliament 
to come to grips with the problems pointed out by a unanimous round-table.  
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Admittedly, since the russophones are now represented in Parliament, the 
significance of the round-table initiatives in the legislative work has diminished 
(Lahelma 1999: 31).” 
 
During nine months no meeting could be arranged due to the fact that the chair of the 
President’s plenipotentiary was left vacant.  At the end of 1997 the Roundtable was 
restructured.  It continued to dialogue on forthcoming amendments and their effects on 
the situation of minorities, without again gaining much attention.  Instead, the institution, 
which had always been regarded by the Estonian political class as an imposed body, was 
increasingly used to pretend internationally that the Estonian state was prepared for 
institutionalised dialogue with the Russian-speaking minority.  In February 1999, four 
prominent representatives of Russian-speakers withdrew their participation, declaring: 
“[...] we cannot comply with the fact that the Roundtable is no longer a forum for a 
dialogue, but it has become a decorative body of ‘collective approval’ [...] we do not 
consider it possible for us to be members of the Roundtable any more.  Nevertheless, we 
will take an active part in all real processes of democratic development of Estonian State 
and society.”
21
  The Roundtable ceased to exist temporarily— and so did the Mission’s 
role in it.
22
 
The Roundtable of National Minority Organisations in Ida-Virumaa has been working 
continuously.  It was initiated by the Mission, which again took on the role of observer.  
The focus of this Roundtable is on projects contributing to the multicultural development 
of the county through information, education, professional training, cultural development 
and inter-ethnic communication.  Fifteen organisations are involved, representing the 
Russian, Belorussian, Tatar, Finnish, Estonian, German, Polish and Jewish communities.  
Although most of them are Russian-speakers, they do not want to be considered part of 
the Russian minority or even be dominated by a “Russian” view.  Eleven out of fifteen 
representatives are female.  The Mission is rather appreciated for its services towards this 
body.  It has helped, for instance, to prepare a multicultural calendar in the languages of 
                                                        
 
21 Statement of members of the Estonian Roundtable, MINELRES: 25 February 1999. 
 
22 After the 1999 national elections, the President nominated a new person to run the institution; a 
special meeting of the Roundtable took place with the presence of the President and the new Minister 
for Inter-ethnic Affairs.  The group discussed the demands of the “dissidents” and postponed a 
definite decision on the future of the Roundtable until after the local elections in October 1999. 
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the respective communities as well as in Estonian and in Russian.  Further, a homepage 
was established on the Internet to allow young people to participate in intercultural 
dialogue as well as to establish contact with people abroad. 
The experience of all international organisations working in Estonia has been that it is 
easier to push the Government towards making concessions than members of Parliament 
who, apart from a small Russian faction, nearly unanimously defend ethnic Estonian 
autarchy and act as a barrier against the recognition of the Russian minority as an integral 
part of the Estonian society; some even wish that Russian-speakers would leave the 
country (Hallik 1998: 277). Already in 1993, the first HoM Klaus Törnudd reported on 
the failure of the Mission to sufficiently influence parliamentary work in Estonia;
23
 his 
statement remains valid.  Whereas the Mission initially commented directly on Estonian 
legislation— comments which were rejected by MPs as a violation of their sovereignty—
the Mission changed its strategy.  Diplomats now meet MPs in person and explain 
international expectations to them directly.  Further, it has received a parliamentary 
invitation to participate in the drafting of the bill on elections and in the work of the 
Committee on the Constitution in order to help create the preconditions for Estonian EU 
membership— presently hindered by the Estonian Constitution.  The Mission may attend 
all the meetings and make recommendations.  MPs appreciate these contacts because the 
diplomats bring along relevant international documents, arrange for Estonian 
interpretation and assist the MPs in their preparations for official journeys abroad to 
attend meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA).  As regards non-citizens, 
the parliamentarians’ interests are rather limited.  Most of them have learned to accept 
the fact that the Mission is useful even when they do not follow its advice because they 
are at least better informed about international reactions to Estonian decisions.  They 
want to prevent international trouble over amended laws which fail to conform with 
international standards and lead the Estonian President to demand certain changes rather 
than merely signing the law— as has already been the case several times. Above all, 
parliamentarians want to prevent public discussions and unrest— and this particular 
objective concurs with the Mission’s aims. 
                                                        
 23 CSCE Mission to Estonia, # 17, 1993: 3. 
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Finally, the OSCE has commissioned its Representative to the Government Commission 
on Military Pensioners, an institution which— in the Estonian perspective— is related to 
Estonian security policy.  Until the end of 1998, the Commission dealt with about 20,000 
applications for residence permits from former Soviet officers and their families.24  
Although the Representative is not entitled to vote; his opinion counts nevertheless.  It is 
a moot point whether former officers of a state that has ceased to exist may in principle 
pose a threat to Estonia.  Under the rule of law, proof can hardly be found that a person 
legally applying for a resident permit could really threaten Estonia’s security because of 
his former responsibilities.  Thus, the majority of applications will get a positive answer 
in the end.  Applicants who succeeded in their first attempt to obtain a temporary 
residence permit must wait another year before they can apply for a permanent residence 
permit.  About 3,000 applicants, however, only got a probationary, temporary residence 
permit and must be reviewed a second time.  When an application is rejected, the 
candidate can take legal action.  In the end, very few persons will be legally rejected.  
Thus, scrutiny of former Soviet officers is highly disputed, and so is the participation of 
the OSCE Representative.  Indeed, he serves the implementation of a bilateral treaty 
between Estonia and Russia.  The whole procedure is also meant to satisfy Estonian 
interests by delaying the full integration of the group into Estonian society as 
internationally required.  The fact that the Government Commission was not able to 
complete its task within four years was due to several long-lasting interruptions of its 
work.  Due to a change of government, the chair of the Committee was left vacant 
several times— in one case for three whole months.  One can hardly imagine the results 
of such a body in Estonia without international supervision.  Although the Government 
wanted to get rid of the Representative until the end of 1998, the office persisted.  The 
Government Commission and OSCE participation in this body are appraised differently 
by persons directly concerned.  Many of them find the OSCE responsible for a degrading 
and rather arbitrary procedure of political and social control and for the aggravation of 
the quality of life of Russian-speaking individuals. 
 
                                                        
 
24 According to Lahelma (1999: 31), 11,000 military pensioners, together with their close relatives, 
amount to some 35,000 persons concerned. 
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4. Advice to individuals 
Non-citizens still lack information and consultative services on their status, and the 
chance to insist on their rights.  This concerns particularly the group of persons who 
were made “illegal”, i.e. any person who— for whatever reason
25
— does not possess legal 
documentation such as an alien’s passport or a passport of another country. Nobody 
knows the size of this group.  The official estimate is 43,000 persons (3 % of the 
population); other sources estimate that it is twice as large, with a minimum of 80,000 
persons.  International organisations had urged the Estonian government to establish an 
ombudsman institution, without much success.  In 1998, the Mission was still 
substituting for such an office (see Chapter VI.2).  The first HoM explained this duty as 
follows:  
“In attempting to respond to the spontaneous visitors, the work of the Mission has 
resembled that of a legal assistance bureau, information office, consulate or 
ombudsman office.  On many occasions, the Mission has been able to help 
individuals by getting in touch with the appropriate Estonian authorities.  As a 
minimum, the office of the Mission served as safety vents, places to which people 
could turn with queries and complaints (Törnudd 1994: 77).” 
 
The system of receiving visitors and handling cases was not planned in the beginning but 
resulted from the expectations of people.  “Drop-in clients from the street” (Lahelma 
1999, 23) believed that the OSCE— representing international opinion— could help them 
on an individual basis.  Most of these visitors were women.
26
  The Mission decided to 
hold regular office hours, trying to combine at least three different functions related to 
the interests of the people, of the Mission and of the Government.  
i. For many people these consulting hours are the only reliable source of information 
beyond rumours, Russian propaganda and incorrect information provided by 
                                                        
 25 Non-citizens become “illegal” when, for instance, mixed families divorce, when parents don’t care 
and miss the date for the registration of their children, when an application for a residence permit 
gets  “lost” in the respective office, or when it is impossible to get personal documents (birth 
certificate, registration certificate) from the offices in Lithuania, Latvia or other states which had 
belonged to the Soviet Union. 
 
26
 They are regarded as more active, more adaptable and more pragmatic than their husbands with 
regard to daily struggles for life as well as participation in local politics and NGOs.  They seem to be 
more prepared to take responsibility for their families, and tend to drink much less than men do 
when faced with difficulties.  Sometimes, however, they are sent by their husbands who want to 
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Estonian officials.  About 80 percent of visitors seek advice on how to organise the 
documents needed in order to apply for residence permits, to reunify families, or to 
arrange visits by relatives in case of illness or death.  They are then given advice on 
how to put together the necessary documentation which increases the chances of a 
successful application.  CMB offices are actually supposed to do this, but often the 
officials themselves do not know the regulations.
27
  People visiting a CMB office 
often do not get any answer or any instructions if they do not know exactly what to 
ask for, and even then they might get an incorrect answer.  
  Some persons coming to the Mission in need of legal advice are sent to one of the 
two NGOs authorised to provide such services.  The Estonian Institute for Human 
Rights (EIHR) is “an independent nationalist group founded by the President” 
which, as recently as 1994, had accused the Mission of “acting as an indirect 
instrument of Russian imperialism (Lahelma 1994: 91).”  Apparently, co-operation 
between the OSCE’s offices in Ida-Virumaa and the Narva office of EIHR, which 
provides people with legal aid free of charge, has been more intensive than with the 
Tallinn office of EIHR.  The Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR) 
is an original NGO, particularly involved in promoting the concerns of Russian-
speaking inhabitants and with outstanding contacts to West European research 
institutes.  LICHR cannot offer services outside Tallinn but is considered as one of 
the few attempts in Estonia to develop competence in the understanding of human 
rights issues, whereas Estonian judges or the legal education system, for instance, 
have remained uninterested. 
  The Mission has helped many people to stay legally in the country, to understand 
what is happening and to deal with the changes.  There are, however, visitors whom 
the Mission admittedly can not help and who are doomed to continue their life as 
“illegals”.  Female Mission members expressed how much they had personally 
                                                                                                                                                                  
escape from the humiliation of going to an office with a request, or who— in case they are still 
employed— cannot or do not want to spend time on these activities. 
 27 Many people have problems with their applications due to the fact that CMB staff, before 1996, 
accepted applications from people who were not entitled to apply and who, since they were never 
informed that their applications would not be processed, wasted time and missed their chance to 
apply in Estonia. 
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suffered when they came across the hopeless situation of many people who had 
become prisoners of their political status and its social and economic consequences.  
ii. People seeking advice in turn contribute to the Mission’s task of collecting 
information.  They particularly serve it as a source of information on general trends 
and everyday problems of non-citizens and their treatment by the administration.  
This part of the Mission’s activity was not shown officially in the Activity Reports, 
and in cases where concrete information was used in communications with 
international representations, the persons concerned were informed in advance.  
iii. Non-citizens have no trust in the Estonian political system and this is a challenge for 
the system itself.  In the face of broken communication between Estonian officials 
and non-citizens, the Mission serves as a bridge, explaining the laws and procedures 
for registration and naturalisation, and motivating visitors to search for needed 
documents and to act according to the regulations.  Thus, the diplomat’s contacts 
with non-citizens contribute to imposing the Government’s policy on non-citizens 
and to submitting them to Estonian rule.  This is in the interest of the Estonian state. 
Over time, these consulting activities have been revised and reduced. The number of 
visitors has also decreased for several reasons.  One is that the office in Tallinn was made 
“invisible”.  In the beginning, it was located within the Estonian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and was visible to everybody because of the long lines in front of it.  This was a 
core motive for the Estonian government to demand that the Mission move to another 
place.  Today, the office in Tallinn is much more difficult to contact.  Even if one knows 
the address, one gets irritated.  No doorplate confirms that one has arrived at the right 
place.  During 1998, the Tallinn office ended its regular office hours as some diplomats 
simply wanted to escape from these demanding drop-in-clients expecting the Mission to 
solve all their problems.  Others no longer wished to comply with a mentality described 
as “Russian” or “apathetic”.  Today, visitors have to make an appointment first.  This 
system gives much more influence to the Estonian secretary and the Deputy HoM who 
can decide to which diplomat a visitor is sent and whether he or she may be admitted at 
all.  A tendency has developed to stop receiving ordinary people and to spend time only 
on persons with a more official background such as diplomats or politicians.  
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The system in the two offices in Ida-Virumaa is different but has also changed since 
1998.  The number of contacting persons had dropped to ten to thirty per week in late 
August 1998.  One explanation, given by a mission member, is that peaks occur only 
around deadlines for applications (e.g. July 1995, July 1996, July-August 1998)  The two 
offices continue to hold office hours on Wednesdays and Thursdays.  Office hours in 
Narva were advertised.  The actual practice regarding the number and duration of office 
hours and their announcement depends not on actual demand but rather on the diplomat 
who is responsible.  After people had queued to be received and lost a week to get a 
comprehensive result, the system was made more efficient.  A person keeps the office 
open for visitors every work day, giving them a form to fill in their names and their 
concerns.  This information is forwarded to the responsible person in the Tallinn office 
who notes what additional information is needed in order to advise the visitor correctly 
and to prepare for this.  One diplomat claimed that all papers and notes on advice which 
had been given are kept in files, as most of the visitors come back after some time with 
additional questions and expect the diplomats to remember their cases in every detail.  
The diplomat interviewed also made it clear that these files are internal documents with 
the sole purpose of meeting the high expectations of the clients.  
Nevertheless, many people are afraid to contact the offices and have no trust in their 
confidentiality.  The Mission has lost confidence among non-citizens because of its close 
relationship with the Estonian government and the impression that it could not or would 
not help directly in cases related to registered or unregistered “illegals”.  Individuals who 
have contacted the Mission in order to get advice have even complained that staff 
members have tried to sound out their past or their political views.  Actually, not every 
diplomat is the right person for this part of the OSCE job for various reasons. 
 
5. Mediation in crisis situations 
During 1993 and 1994, the Mission— together with the HCNM— acted as a direct 
mediator between the Estonian State and representatives of non-citizens in Estonia’s 
Northeast.  Tensions increased with uncertainties around their legal status, when new 
laws related to naturalisation, language or elections were prepared.  When the Estonian 
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Law on Aliens was amended in early 1993, many people felt that Russian-speaking non-
citizens might even be threatened with expulsion.  Whereas Estonian President Meri was 
persuaded by the HCNM, backed by experts from the CoE, to veto the law, 
representatives of the Russian minority were in turn persuaded by the HCNM, with the 
help of the Mission in Tallinn and its two offices in Narva and Jõhvi, to abstain from 
escalating action.  When non-citizens announced strikes in the Northeast and prepared 
for a referendum on territorial autonomy in the cities of Narva and Sillamäe, the Estonian 
authorities were motivated to tolerate the referendum, and the representatives of the 
Russian community were motivated to assure that they would respect the territorial 
integrity of Estonia and a forthcoming decision by the National Court on whether the 
referendum was against the Estonian Constitution.
28
  Escalation of the conflict into a 
self-reinforcing cycle was prevented when the referendum was given a symbolic 
character instead of a decision-making one.  
A similar crisis appeared in 1994 when the Mission, together with the HCNM, learned 
during a meeting in Narva of a plan for a so-called civil disobedience campaign with the 
object of persuading non-citizens not to register for residence permits.  
“If the campaign had been successfully organised, a complicated situation would 
have arisen.  On the one hand, toleration of the campaign would have signified an 
inability on the part of the Government to implement the Law on Aliens.  On the 
other hand, a situation in which those refusing to register would have faced the 
threat of expulsion from Estonia, could have led to a conflict with Russia. The 
Government was informed of the danger by the High Commissioner and the 
Mission, and the Narva Russian leaders were warned of the consequences if the plan 
would have been put into action (Lahelma 1999: 35).” 
 
Since then, no comparable crisis has been reported but the Mission still gets involved in 
individual cases, for instance when a person is going to be expelled, before the incident 
becomes politicised.  In order to help to manage these cases, at least one diplomat is 
always available.  Diplomats try to limit the damage when they appear on the spot, and 
help calm emotions.  The Mission does not officially report on these cases in its Activity 
Reports.  
 
                                                        
 28 Max van der Stoel, in Birckenbach (1997: 247-249). 
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6. Societal projects 
The Mission aims to contribute to the emergence of civil society by advising and 
supporting NGOs.  One can observe a pattern.  The Mission brings together non-state as 
well as governmental and international actors, raises the interest of foreign embassies and 
motivates financiers to invest directly or indirectly in projects related to the conflict 
formation in Estonia and its transformation.  This primarily concerns projects which aim 
at establishing co-operative structures at the Estonian-Russian border, acting against the 
root causes of a high incidence of crime, preventing consequences of the deprivation and 
helping members of the Russian-speaking minority to bear their specific problems.  These 
small NGO projects all play a role in the Mission’s overall attempt to make political 
institutions and society recognise the presence of a Russian-speaking minority in the 
country.  Before the functions of the projects are explained more clearly, they are 
described in more detail.  
Inside and outside the Mission, it is generally agreed that NGOs play an important role in 
conflict resolution activities; however, it is also agreed that the Mission’s challenge is to 
establish and to maintain contacts with NGOs which hardly exist.  
Efforts to support dialogue among intellectuals remained unsuccessful.  The idea to 
bring together journalists working for Russian-language and Estonian-language 
newspapers has failed.  Even seminars with outstanding experts from abroad were almost 
ignored by journalists working for Estonian-language newspapers.  A new attempt was 
made in spring 1998.  It, too, failed as journalists from the Estonian press showed no 
interest.  The reason is not only their reluctance to meet Russians but also their 
obligations to different clients.  Estonian readers are not expected to be interested in 
information on Russian-speakers.  Correspondingly, journalists do not feel obliged to 
report on their life or even to co-operate with Russian-language newspapers.  One 
attempt failed when the Estonian authorities persuaded the administering NGO to 
withdraw just before the event.  The existing asymmetry regarding contacts abroad also 
works as a barrier against joint seminars.  Journalists working for Estonian-language 
newspapers do not need the OSCE in order to make contacts with newspapers in 
Western Europe.  The Mission was also not very successful in establishing better 
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contacts between Russian-speaking and Estonian-speaking teachers and in arranging 
common seminars on the education system.  Efforts to motivate researchers from both 
communities to engage in dialogue on the situation of the country also failed.  Even the 
authors of the Estonian government’s Integration Strategy are hardly able to engage in 
dialogue with one another.  In the light of these experiences, most diplomats are rather 
sceptical about whether, in today’s Estonia, a class of intellectuals exists at all.  
Representatives of Russian-speakers confirm this view, pointing to the fact that most 
intellectuals have left the country and now work abroad.  
 
a.  Developing the NGO sector 
In a country where civil society is underdeveloped, efforts are required to find the NGOs 
which already exist and to learn about their activities and needs.  In order to establish 
contacts with Estonian state officials as well as foreign embassies, the Mission invited 
several representatives of international organisations and the states for a roundtable 
together with NGOs.
29
  Here, they got the chance to present their work to the UNDP, 
the Nordic Council and to the EU as well as to the embassies of France, Finland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
In 1998, the Mission, with the help of the German Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 
organised a series of training seminars in Tallinn, Narva and Jõhvi for individuals and 
NGOs active in minority issues wanting to gain additional qualifications in project 
management, team-work, networking as well as fundraising.  Serious difficulties resulted 
due to language problems.  Integrated Russian-Estonian seminars were held in German 
and translated into Estonian, which did not work very well.  Other seminars were held 
separately in Estonian or Russian translated from the German.  In Narva, seminars were 
held in German and translated into Russian, but Estonians were also welcome.  One 
attempt failed due to a lack of participants. 
                                                        
 29 Participants were the Network of Non-Profit Associations/Foundations (NAFE); the Narva Trade 
Union Center (NTUC); the Lake Peipsi Project (LPP); The Twenty-First Century Fund (TFCP); the 
Civic Education Center (CEF); the Legal Information Center on Human Rights (LICHR); the 
Estonian Union of National Minorities (EUNM). 
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The diplomats further advise NGOs on how to write applications for projects and 
support them by writing recommendations to potential financiers.  Additionally, the 
Mission encourages people who have proposed projects and seem capable of completing 
the task.  To a certain degree, the Mission stimulated or initiated certain projects and lent 
its auspices.  Projects cover three major issues:  improvement of bilateral co-operation in 
the Estonian-Russian border region, language training, and, although less intensively, 
action against underlying reasons for crime in northeastern Estonia.  
 
b.  Supporting co-operation in the Estonian-Russian border region  
The threat of secession of Northeast Estonia, which existed in the early nineties, has 
disappeared completely.  The real danger now is the disastrous socio-economic situation.  
Together with the UNDP, two NGOs— one Estonian, the other Russian— running 
together the Lake Peipsi Project (LPP) (Transboundary Environmental Information 
Agency), as well as the Estonian town of Narva and the Russian town of Ivangorod, the 
OSCE organised a series of three conferences in 1997.  The purpose of these 
conferences was to discuss visa and transit regimes, work and residence permits, 
procedures in case of disputes, and ideas of projects formulated by local actors on both 
sides of the border.  The final conference, the Narva Forum: Towards Sustainable 
Development in the Estonian-Russian Border Zone, was held at Narva fortress on the 
Estonian side, and included an excursion to the Ivangorod fortress on the Russian side.  
The Forum brought together some 200 participants, including representatives from 
various levels of the Russian and Estonian governments, NGOs from both countries, and 
activists and experts from Estonia, Russia and other countries.  Embassy representatives 
and international organisations also took part.  The purpose was to discuss particular 
problems on both sides of the border and to develop recommendations to local and 
national governments on the need for further regional co-operation in the Estonian-
Russian border area.  Another aim was to promote communication and coperation on 
relevant transborder issues among various levels of government, community 
representatives, NGOs and experts.  A unique feature of the Narva Forum was that, in 
the working groups, NGOs worked side-by-side with Estonian and Russian government 
and administration officials.  The conference mainly focused on issues such as the role of 
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self-governments and local communities, legal norms for transborder co-operation, 
relations between municipal, county governments and national governments when 
handling transborder issues as well as mechanisms for an increased role of community 
groups in promoting transborder co-operation.  Among other issues, the following were 
discussed: obtaining work permits in the other country; family reunification; co-operation 
between local border community governments; simplified border crossing and visas; 
“illegals”; pensions; bus and water transport connections between border towns and 
localities in Russia and Estonia; the prevention and fight against crime in the border area; 
and sustainable development.   
Apart from a small amount of money spent by the OSCE, this conference was first 
financed by the embassy of the Netherlands, later also by the embassies of the USA, 
Norway, and Britain as well as by the MacArthur Foundation and the Estonian Open 
Society Foundation (Soros).  The Narva Forum became the starting point for many 
seminars and projects. 
One of the results of this conference is the project Community Development and Cross-
Border Co-operation in the Estonian Border Area - Information Forums, Trainings and 
Consultations for Local Self-Governments and Community Leaders, carried out by the 
LPP.  Its purpose is to empower local authorities and municipal representatives to 
formulate common goals related to the protection of the environment and sustainable 
development in their region.  This project is, again, financed by the MacArthur 
Foundation.  It is advised by Danish partners with the support of the Danish Foreign 
Ministry.  The OSCE has taken the role of an observer and remains in contact with all 
the actors.  
Thus, the three conferences and the long-term project have helped create a continuous 
structure that allows the Mission to propose ideas for increased co-operation in the 
border zone.  One example is the preparation for a regime to make regular border traffic 
easier, at least during the summer holidays.  The involvement of the Mission is as 
follows: either the Mission itself or other actors develop an idea, for example to increase 
the staff at borders, to extend the period of validity of a visa or to handle an issue in a 
more flexible way.  Before organising the talks, the Mission tries to foresee the reaction 
of the Estonian State.  If it expects the Government to reject the proposal by pointing to 
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the Schengen treaty of the EU, the Mission seeks first to explore the Finnish experience 
when this country successfully negotiated with the EU on a similar visa regime for 
Karelia.  The next step for the Mission is to propose a pilot project for a summer border 
regime that reflects the Finnish experience and also meets Estonian interests in 
demonstrating excellent European behaviour in order to qualify for EU membership. 
 
c.  Preventing crime  
Northeast Estonia faces an extremely high crime rate.  One third of Estonian alcoholics 
live in this region and 3,000 drug addicts are registered in Narva; 70 % of crime in this 
region is drug-related.  Estonian politicians hide this problem or give it an ethnic bias, 
regarding it as a problem of “unkempt Russians”.  In order to promote public dialogue as 
well as to increase awareness, facilitate community-building and bring the police closer 
to the public, the Mission organised several public meetings with the Police Prefect in 
Narva, upon the request of NGOs.  The first was held in October 1997.  Because it 
received much attention and positive reactions, a second meeting was organised in June 
1998.  The mere fact that the Police Prefect was ready to answer questions was 
considered as progress.  As the interest in such meetings has been increasing, the Mission 
plans to organise more as long as NGOs and community workers are prepared to 
gradually take over responsibility for such activities. 
The Mission strove for a similar development by supporting an NGO project aimed at 
establishing a rehabilitation centre for drug users, and proposed two diplomats as contact 
persons to the CoE.  With the assistance of the transnational network ADRA, its 
Estonian branch and with funds from the CoE, the project aims to supply consultation 
services to those suffering from alcohol and drug abuse, including family members who 
may be in need of support; to provide hospital treatment and participation in a 
rehabilitation programme; as well as to support health education in state schools.  Not all 
projects benefit from the Mission’s continuous support; it may be withdrawn if, for 
example, it finds out that the organisers have strayed from the original course. 
In the same way, the Mission offered its services as a co-operating agency for a project 
on Youth Integration in Narva proposed by the Narva Youth Centre which opened in 
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1998 as part of the Department of Education of the Municipality of Narva and—
following a recommendation from the Mission— was financed by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers.  This project aims to provide young people with access to information 
technology, counselling and training services related to psychological, legal, social and 
employment issues as well as special courses for youth leaders and youth workers.  The 
project is targeted at unemployed youth, street youth and handicapped young people.  
The Mission’s application to the CoE explains:  
“Lack of information, low self confidence and initiative, few experience of 
communication with Estonian-speaking young people, etc. have caused a 
tendency towards social exclusion, apathy and problems with seeing perspectives 
for the personal development in the Estonian society among minority youth.  This 
situation is also considered one of the main reasons for the high level of crime 
and drug abuse among youth in the region.  Without funding for activities 
directed towards the youth, there is a risk of ‘a lost generation’, which may lead 
to social problems if not in the near future, then in 15-20 years time.” 
 
 
d.  Accentuating the Estonian government’s integration strategy  
The Mission has been further involved in projects embedded in the Estonian 
government’s official Integration Policy which puts hopes in the educational system and 
language training, and which is mostly financed with money from West European states.  
Usually, the goal is to motivate Russian-speakers to learn Estonian.  The Mission 
participates as an observer in the Estonian Language Training Programme financed by 
the PHARE Programme and co-ordinated by the office of the UNDP in Tallinn.  It also 
tries to introduce a different trend against the dominant strategy of assimilation.  The 
more the Mission is involved in language training projects, the more the focus is on 
evening out certain taboo consequences of Estonian language politics; these projects also 
aim to break the self-reinforcing circle of impoverishment, ignorance, discrimination, 
disregard for and aggravation of social and political problems in Estonia.  
Against this trend of making the Estonian language all-mighty, the Mission tries to keep 
bilingualism on the agenda and points to the fact that Russian speakers will learn the 
Estonian language, if at all, as a second language— an insight that would demand official 
recognition of the Russian language in Estonia.  In order to build a consensus on 
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introducing methods for teaching Estonian as a second language, the Mission initiated 
and sponsored a seminar on Integration through Education in Estonia held in Tartu in 
May 1997, with a follow-up in April 1998.  The organisers reported as a success that a 
relative consensus was reached among the participants (among them the Minister of 
Education, Members of Parliament, local representatives and academics as well as 
representatives of international organisations) that the aim of minority language 
education should be to achieve bilingualism in order to enable members of minorities to 
fully participate in society at large and to preserve their cultural identity.  The fact that it 
took one year before the OSCE was able to report that an already existing and 
comparable Latvian programme was presented to the Estonian Ministry of Education 
highlights how difficult it is to overcome the rigidity of Estonian language policy.  
Initiated by the Mission, organised by the Lake Peipsi Project (see above) and financed 
by the Norwegian embassy, a two-week summer camp brought together in Mustvee 
(Eastern Estonia), in July and August 1997, 100 Russian-speaking children from Narva.  
These children, aged 10-17, lived with Estonian-speaking families, enjoyed four hours of 
daily instruction in the Estonian language, culture, folk music and dance, and went on 
excursions with their teachers.  This pilot project was followed by similar projects in 
Mustvee and in Räpina (Southern Estonia) in summer 1998 with about 180 children, and 
including a “thank you programme” in the Russian-speaking parts of Ida-Virumaa.  This 
follow-up was again financed by the Norwegian embassy and, additionally, by the British 
embassy.  The Mission functioned as an observer.  Officially, these projects aim to 
support the integration of Russian-speaking youth; however, the project is also 
worthwhile regardless of what the children really learn during the summer camp for 
several reasons: the projects belong to the very few initiatives which can demonstrate 
that the burden of integration is not only to be laid on Russians but on Estonians too— in 
this particular case on the Estonians serving as host families.  The project also 
contributes to recognising the existence of a Russian-speaking youth which needs fun 
holidays like other children in order to cope with the difficult conditions in Estonia.  The 
fact that even Estonian newspapers published short articles on the summer camps and the 
Russian children was evaluated by Estonian experts as major progress in inter-ethnic 
relations.  
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The Mission also supported an international summer camp organised by the Ahtme 
Juvenile Center in the 75 % Russian-speaking town of Kohtla-Järve in order to give 25 
children from Estonia the opportunity to improve their English, and about 35 children 
from Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands to improve their Russian as well as to enjoy a 
common trip to Finland.  Further, the Mission became involved in a project to provide 
Russian-speaking orphans Estonian language skills and computer training in order to 
enhance their chances of living in Estonia.  Unfortunately, the Mission was not able to 
secure financial support for this project. 
Surmounting language barriers is also the focus of seven projects under the general 
heading Integration in Estonia - Spot Projects for Integration & Language Training 
1998 for which the Mission, together with the OSCE Representative, applied to the CoE.  
Because of interventions by the Estonian representative in the CoE, this package failed in 
some parts, causing the Mission to shuttle between Strasbourg and Tallinn in order to 
defend the application at one place and to struggle for the commitment of the Estonian 
government at the other. 
This was particularly the case with the project Integration of Widows and Divorcees of 
Ex-Soviet Military Officers into the Estonian Society.  According to the troop 
withdrawal arrangement of 1994, former military bases in Estonia were abandoned but 
widows and divorcees were left behind with their children and found themselves in 
desolate, decaying towns, particularly in Ämari, Paldiski and Klooga.  In April 1995, 
representatives of these women approached the OSCE Representative’s office seeking 
advice and help.  With the support of the IOM, the World Council of Churches and the 
Danish embassy, the office was able to organise six-week Introductory Integration 
Courses in co-operation with the Tallinn Employment Office.  However, it became 
obvious that theses women needed longer programmes more focused on their particular 
situation.  After the office of the OSCE Representative advised the women to establish 
an NGO, the “Union of Widows and Divorcees of ex-Soviet military officers” surfaced. 
This group developed a project especially designed to prepare 50 women, aged 35-50, 
and 50 children, aged 12-18, in the space of nine months to take the Estonian language 
exam— a precondition for applying for Estonian citizenship. 
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The OSCE Mission fulfils a variety of functions within such projects.  In the beginning, 
the office operates as a contact point.  Diplomats then help to generate experiences 
within a pre-project; encourage the establishing of a new NGO; assist in the formulation 
of an application for an internationally financed project; offer their services as a co-
operating agency, as an adviser, as an observer, as well as part of an evaluating team.  
Mission members lobby for the project in Estonia, including international representative 
offices, as well as internationally at ODIHR or at the IOM.  In the particular case of the 
project on widows and divorcees, the HoM lobbied at the CoE.  He also sought to obtain 
the agreement of the Estonian government— which, obviously, was the core problem.  
As all efforts were apparently doomed to fail because of the Estonian veto and the CoE’s 
unwillingness to accept the project despite the veto, the Mission took an exceptional 
step.  Usually, Mission members shy away from the media; in this case, however, the 
Estonian assistant of the OSCE Representative was allowed to draw international 
attention by giving an interview to an English language weekly, The Baltic Times, which 
published an article on the situation of these women and their children (Cengel 1998, 
1998a).  Before this happened, a further project had been designed.  This project was 
rather similar to the first one but picked up one objection of the Estonian government 
against the first project— that it was designed to serve Russians only and, consequently, 
was not in the interest of Estonians.  Thus, the second project was given a broader 
design related to both Estonian and non-Estonian women, as indicated in the title: Joint 
Integration Project for non-Estonian and Estonian Single Parent Women.  
The idea for such a project has its roots in the women’s movement, which has developed 
in Estonia with the help of the Nordic Council and is rather influenced by the Nordic 
women’s networking culture.  A “Women Foundation” was established.  This is an 
umbrella organisation of several Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking women 
members, can serve as the executing agency
30
 and can easily meet the demand for co-
operation between Estonian and non-Estonian women.  The application for the project 
outlines three objectives: (a) social integration of non-Estonian women in Estonia 
                                                        
 30 Other co-operation agencies: (a) Estonian Women’s Association; (b) Union of Mothers of 
Handicapped Children; (c) Narva Women’s Organisation and the OSCE Mission to Estonia. 
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through joint programs with Estonian women; (b) giving a chance to women in need 
(citizens and non-citizens) for a better social and economic position through language 
and computer training; (c) bringing together two ethnic groups, giving non-citizens a 
chance and a challenge to use the Estonian language they are currently learning.  
The target group consists particularly of women in need, i.e. single women and mothers 
of disabled children and unemployed women, who cannot afford to spend money on 
training for a life in Estonia.  200 women from Tallinn, Narva and Kohtla-Järve and 
smaller places— of which 120 were non-Estonian and 80 Estonian— signed up to the idea 
of a common course.  The eight-month program for the ethnically mixed groups of 15 
women includes, beyond language and computer training, workshops on Estonian and 
Russian history, culture and traditions as well as workshops on several women’s issues 
such as the rights of women and children. 
The OSCE again helped with the preparation of the application, lobbied within the 
country and abroad, prepared for the role of a co-operation agency and involvement in 
the monitoring and evaluation of the project.  Despite all this support, the project failed 
at the CoE because of Estonian objections.  In the end, however, the OSCE in Estonia 
was able to find other financial sources, including again money from the IOM.  The 
credit for getting this large project to run successfully goes very much to the OSCE 
Representative’s assistant, Tiina Ilsen. 
The Narva Regional Language Centre estimated in 1998 that, starting from zero 
knowledge of Estonian language, it takes approximately 300 hours (1.5 years) to reach 
the level required for citizenship.  This would cost about 3,000 EEK (the average 
monthly income in 1998 was 1,801 EEK, the monthly unemployment benefit 300 EEK). 
One can see from these figures that cost is an insurmountable hurdle for most Russian-
speakers.  The Estonian authorities, however, still refuse to recognise this fact. 
Consequently, the Mission also supported projects aiming at improving language training 
for nurses, teachers and public administration personnel.  The relevance of these 
particular occupational groups can hardly be denied by the Estonian government.  The 
OSCE applied to the CoE for a project on specialised language training for nurses 
working with the hospital in Kohtla-Järve in Ida-Virumaa.  Due to the Estonian language 
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laws, more than half of the 301 nurses need language training in order to be allowed to 
continue to work but cannot afford to pay for the courses because of their low salaries.  
The application to the CoE points to the official ideology which bans Russian-speakers 
from their jobs and emphasises that, by improving the language skills of nurses, patients 
from all ethnic backgrounds will benefit; it will also enhance the relations between 
different ethnic groups when they can find equal health care and can communicate in 
their mother tongue when this is of vital importance.  Thus, Estonian language courses 
are seen as a means of confidence-building in society. 
Because Estonian laws demand Estonian language skills as a precondition for 
naturalisation as well as for entrance to universities or for job applications, the country 
needs better-qualified teachers.  In the face of the low interest of Estonian-speaking 
teachers in settling in the Russian-speaking town of Narva, Estonian language training in 
schools and kindergartens is mostly done by teachers whose mother tongue is also 
Russian and who are not trained to teach Estonian.  Neither the Narva Municipality nor 
the teachers can pay the fees for additional language training.  This is the background to 
the project Language Training for Teachers in Narva. 
A similar background can be found in the case of the project aiming at Education of 
Russian-Speaking Students of Estonia in Public Administration.  Fed by money from the 
EU PHARE Programme, the Tallinn Pedagogical University and the Tallinn Technical 
University, together with Manchester Metropolitan University and University College 
Galway (Ireland), developed a speciality in public administration.  The Estonian State, 
however, gives grants only to students with Estonian citizenship.  The study programme 
was then opened also for non-citizens, under the condition that they speak Estonian.  
Most of the students who have these skills, however, are not willing to look for a job in 
the Russian-speaking parts of the country.  Consequently, it is increasingly difficult to 
find trained employees who can contribute to the modernisation of public administration 
in Northeast Estonia.  Thus, the OSCE project proposed to fund a five-year education 
programme for Russian-speakers (including Estonian language training) who are ready to 
work for at least five years in Ida-Virumaa.  The Mission’s role in this project has been 
decisive.  Diplomats discussed the project together with the academic initiators and 
representatives of public administration in Ida-Virumaa.  They prepared letters of 
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support, recommendations and lobbied at the CoE.  When the initiators from the Tallinn 
Pedagogical University and the Presidential Roundtable first contacted foreign 
embassies, they received friendly replies, but no money.  It was not until the Mission 
gave a positive signal that the British and Norwegian governments were prepared to 
finance the first group of students.  Then, the Soros Foundation gave money for 15 
additional students.  Finally, the CoE decided during summer 1998 to finance another six 
students for four years.  The Mission, however, had applied for grants for 30 students for 
five years.  There is much evidence that, even in this case, it was necessary to lobby the 
Estonian government not to object the project. 
 
e.  Summary of the functions of the NGO projects  
In the overall strategy of the Mission, activities related to projects are given a minor role 
and it is not a coincidence that these grassroots activities are mostly women’s work and 
are perceived in the Mission as such.  The female staff members, however, plead for 
increased emphasis on this type of work.  The statement given by Cathy Cosman, a US 
diplomat who had worked in the Mission in 1997-1998, supports this view: 
“When I served on the OSCE Mission in Estonia, I observed that a primary—  
certainly not the sole— effort of the Mission was to act on a view of the Russian 
minority as a population whose rights had [to] be defended from the outside, 
rather than trying to help in the creation of domestic mechanisms and structures 
through which Estonians and Russians could settle their own differences as they 
saw fit in the long run.  Perhaps the Mission view of the status of the Russian 
minority was correct in the early days of the re-established Estonian Republic, but 
by the time I got to Estonia that was no longer so much the case.  Indeed, if one 
looks at the OSCE Mission mandate for Estonia, it emphasizes the need for the 
Mission to cooperate with the local NGO community, including trade unions, 
both among local Russians and Estonians.  To my mind, the NGO community in 
Estonia has been quite weak, at least as far as the advocacy of the rights of not 
only ethnic minorities but also socially disadvantaged groups— which of course 
include Estonians (street children, people who live on former soviet military 
bases) as well.  Therefore, while I had the opportunity to work on the Mission, I 
tried to encourage the Mission to work in the direction of serving as a forum 
through which Estonians and the ethnic minorities could discuss difficult issues, 
as well as organizing educational opportunities for NGOs in Russian-minority 
parts of Tallinn and in Narva.”
31
 
                                                        
 
31 Cathy Cosman, MINELRES 25 July 1999 (List archive: http://www.riga.lv/minelres/archive.htm). 
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In other words, the relevance of the Mission’s involvement in projects is highly disputed 
amongst the members.  Some diplomats regard them as a “sweetener”, contributing to 
calming down emotions generated by the continued presence of the Mission and to 
demonstrating that some progress is occurring and that the Mission is not idle.  Others 
regard the projects as one of the few possibilities for raising attention, at least indirectly, 
to the real problem: the danger that Estonia will experience regional and social 
fragmentation. 
Looking at the projects described above, one can observe a common structure.  The 
focus is on disadvantaged Russian-speaking groups, particularly women (widows, 
divorced and abandoned women, single parents, nurses), young people, students, drug 
users as well as groups like teachers, ranging at the lower end of the wage scale and who 
are directly threatened by the Estonian language laws.  The primary orientation is 
towards Estonian language training according to the official demands of the language 
policy which wants Russians to speak Estonian and make Estonian society forget about 
Russian-speakers in the country which should become mono–lingual.  The OSCE agrees 
that Russians should learn Estonian, but they should not forget Russian.  All of the 
applications which were submitted to the CoE have at least Estonian, Russian and 
English as working languages.  Projects follow a charitable approach of social welfare 
aiming at helping individuals cope better with a given political situation, without 
explicitly questioning its ethno-political background.  
Nonetheless, the Mission’s concept is not apolitical.  Firstly, although language training 
is in line with the anti-Russian language policy of Estonia, it will enable persons 
belonging to the trained groups, in the long run, to achieve an integrated social position.  
This is not necessarily part of the aims of the current Estonian elite, although its members 
can hardly oppose it directly.  Secondly, even after Russian-speakers have passed the 
language exam, they will continue to speak and think in Russian.  Nothing can and 
should prevent them from doing so, and no-one can accuse them of breaking the law.  
Thirdly, that the needs of the Russian-speaking population and problems like drug-abuse, 
social dilapidation and impoverishment draw attention and are even reported on 
internationally— not via Activity Reports but via substantial applications for funding— is 
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not welcomed by the Estonian government.  It is tolerated only because politicians do 
not want to risk a confrontation with the OSCE and must show a certain degree of 
flexibility when seeking support for EU membership, and because the projects are 
financed by “additional” foreign resources and do not cost Estonia any money. 
When evaluating the contribution of these projects to problem-solving in Estonia, it is 
important to make several distinctions.  Projects are of high relevance to those people 
who participate in them directly— mainly the respective NGOs as well as their clients.  If 
one has in mind the extent of the problems deriving from the exclusion of the majority of 
Russian-speakers from political and social participation, then the benefits of the projects 
to society as a whole are marginal.  Politically, the projects may contribute to the 
enrichment of official Estonian integration rhetoric with a few liberal ideas, and to the 
motivation of some politicians to abstain from nationalism.  It appears rather doubtful 
whether the projects will support the recognition of Russian as one of the official 
languages in Estonia.  
Last but not least, the projects count in a mostly symbolic sense and serve as a 
bargaining chip.  In this respect, even projects which could not be realised are relevant 
for the general process.  As important as their realisation is, so too is the process of 
negotiating them— when the Estonian government is asked to give its opinion, to 
recognise existing problems, and to agree that something needs to be done to solve them.  
Here is the most important role of the projects within the OSCE diplomacy which abides 
by the following philosophy: formulate a project, organise the means for realising it, and 
link the idea with the work of an NGO so that the OSCE can withdraw from direct 
involvement as soon as possible. 
The experience, however, remains that, if the Mission does not launch such a process, 
such projects are rare or have little chances of survival after the first grant has ended. 
NGOs are as dependent as ever on international resources.  One consequence is that 
projects financed with foreign money (for instance, by the EU in the education sector) 
will hardly change the exclusive Estonian political structure, but rather exist in parallel as 
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a second structure.
32  This tendency is counteracted only if the Mission has been 
successful in linking its involvement in projects as much as possible with its other fields 
of activity (particularly the collection of information, reporting, co-ordination of 
international actors, advising state institutions as well as individuals).  Otherwise, 
project-related activities seem to be a bottomless pit. 
                                                        
 
32 After the Estonian Language Law was again amended in summer 1999 and strong reservations had 
been made before by the OSCE, the Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar announced for the first time 
the plan “to open a state financed Estonian language, Russian school in Narva which is for non-
Estonians to learn the Estonian language.” (BT 8-14 July 1999).  
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VI. CLOSING DOWN OR TRANSFORMATION OF THE MISSION?  
After more than six years of existence, one cannot avoid the question of how long the 
Mission will remain in the country.  The mandate demands a decision on its prolongation 
every six months, without giving any criteria for making a decision on when it has 
become pointless.  Although Estonia must agree to each prolongation, a political 
consensus is needed within the OSCE to decide upon the end of the Mission.  The easiest 
way for Estonia to obtain such a decision would be a radical change of the Estonian 
policy in its approach towards Russian-speakers.  The Estonian elite, however, is not 
prepared for such a change.  The mandate does include the obligation to consider ways 
and means of transferring the Mission’s responsibilities to institutions or organisations 
representing the local population.  The Mission’s activities, in fact, still appear to be a 
long-term matter.  A projection of the different political interests at play gives the 
following picture. 
 
1. State actors and their interests 
The Estonian State never shared the view that citizenship and related problems represent 
a conflict of international relevance.  On the contrary, related international discussions 
have been regarded as anti-Estonian propaganda and Estonian officials have often 
complained about international interference.  Beyond the HCNM, it was particularly the 
Mission which came under Estonian fire.  Since the beginning, the Mission has been 
regarded as a burden, laid by Russia on Estonia’s small shoulders, limiting the State’s 
sovereignty regarding the treatment of Russian-speakers in the country.  Estonia 
hesitated upon several occasions to agree with the prolongation of the Mission’s 
mandate.  In the OSCE Permanent Council, Estonia has argued that the Mission has a 
stigmatising effect and that a peaceful society cannot be labelled as a potential crisis area.  
The mandates of the various OSCE missions should therefore be differentiated and the 
task of the missions further clarified.  Similarly, the idea of devising ‘exit strategies’ has 
been brought up by Estonia (Lahelma 1999: 23).  Because no Estonian government 
could actually escape the OSCE’s decision to deploy the Mission in Tallinn, the State 
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came to terms with it, tried to influence its activities, and learned how to make the best 
use of it; criticism thereby became more moderate.  The HCNM, whose emphasis on 
international standards and critical comments on Estonian policy towards the Russian-
speaking minority are more clear than the Mission’s statements, became the main target 
of complaint.  Although the opinion still prevails that the Mission is a ballast to be shed 
as early as possible, a few but growing number of politicians approve of the continuation 
of the Mission.  They point to its usefulness in protecting Estonia against Russia’s 
accusations as well as to the fact that it reports on Estonian developments in a positive 
light and attracts some international attention to the small state which otherwise would 
have sunk into oblivion in the face of the turmoil in Russia and the world.  In their view, 
the fact that a long-term Mission has been sent to this small country has contributed to 
the recognition of the Estonian nation.  They also suggest, somehow cynically that, with 
time, Estonia will learn to see the Mission as less hostile, and will learn to use it 
according to its national interests.  Estonian President Meri received the support of the 
Estonian government, including that of Prime Minister Mart Laar and Foreign Minister 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, when he proposed in June 1999 to reorganise the Tallinn Mission 
into a research and training centre.
33  
Member states of the EU, especially Denmark and Finland, have demonstrated their 
financial interest in closing down the Mission and promise that this will happen before 
long in the context of EU enlargement, thus flattering Estonian interests.  Observers do 
not think it probable that, despite generous West European funding, Estonian language 
policy will put an end to social and political tensions.  Thus, the EU will have to decide, 
sooner or later, how to tackle this crisis-prone EU candidate.  It is rather doubtful that 
the EU, in the face of the international dimension of the conflict, is willing to do without 
the OSCE’s competence in security issues.  Nonetheless, the drive for the enlargement of 
the EU is the main chance for Estonia to get rid of the Mission. 
It is also rather unlikely that the Russian State will agree to end the Mission in Tallinn as 
long as it cannot buy other advantages.  The OSCE is aware that the violation of Russian 
interests represents a security risk for Estonia and may cause a backlash with respect to 
                                                        
 
33
 BT 17-30 June 1999. 
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OSCE activities in other crisis areas, i.e. Russia could in turn cease to tolerate the OSCE 
Assistance Group operating in Chechnya.  In the view of one Mission member, the US is 
particularly interested in freeing bilateral dialogue with Russia from complaints on human 
rights violations in Estonia by referring to the Mission to Estonia when Russia brings up 
the issue.
34
  
 
2. The Views of the OSCE and of Mission members 
Most Mission members hesitate to discuss the question of staying.  They point to the fact 
that not they but the OSCE in Vienna will decide on their future.  Their point of view 
conforms with the statement which expresses the official phrasing of the former Finnish 
HoM Lahelma and the Finnish legal expert Allan Rosas.  
“The decision to terminate the activities of the Mission, however, should be taken 
on the basis of progress achieved in reducing tensions which negatively affect the 
different communities in Estonia, as well as the regional situation as a whole 
(Rosas and Lahelma 1997: 183).” 
 
However, the diplomats left the meaning of this overriding consideration of “regional 
situation as a whole” unclear.  In general, they use the phrasing according to which the 
Mission’s stay will be prolonged until Estonia becomes a member of the EU. Informally, 
many diplomats are of a different mind.  Some say that the Mission has already fulfilled 
its duties, with a few exceptions to be solved within the short period until Estonia 
becomes an EU member state.  Others point to the need for the OSCE to increase 
pressure in order to be able to stay in the face of the overwhelming impact of the EU and 
its economic priorities for Estonia.  Others consider that the Mission is relevant to the 
all-European security policy in the foreseeable future.  One reason is the Russian doctrine 
according to which it was the duty of the Russian army to protect “Russians in the near 
abroad”.  Former HoM Lahelma reminds one of the extent to which the OSCE missions 
to Estonia and to Latvia are politically inter-linked (Lahelma 1999: 37). 
                                                        
 
34
 “There are clear indications that the Russian Federation would oppose any attempt to amend the 
mandate of the Mission, let alone to terminate its activities.” (Lahelma 1999: 23). 
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Additionally, some diplomats explain that the Mission will be further needed to prevent 
domestic tensions in Estonia for the foreseeable future.  One reason is that Estonia is still 
not ready to establish an ombudsman institution, as demanded already in the report of the 
ODIHR fact-finding mission.35   However, even an ombudsman institution could not 
satisfy the need for consultation of those people who have to live “illegally” in Estonia 
and cannot— for understandable reasons— provide those documents requested by the 
Estonian State from Lithuania, Latvia or other former Soviet countries, for the 
application for a legal status.  The Mission is the only official institution which they can 
contact without giving a name or an address.  For reasons of principle, the management 
of these problems cannot be transferred to Estonian institutions as long as the Estonian 
government is not prepared to give these persons a legal existence.  
Mission members still feel the need to work on creating a civil society.  The country still 
lacks people with ideas for civil society projects.  The network of NGOs has remained 
sparse and dependent on foreign donors.  The criteria for the projects of the 
governmental “Non-Estonian Integration Foundation” which could, in principle, provide 
support, remained unclear and dubious.  Mission members are also aware of the fact that 
the development of democratic structures and institutions is far behind expectations and 
the positive image of Estonia held by West European actors.  
A further socio-psychological question remains completely unsolved: how can Estonia 
ever surmount the sense of guilt resulting, day after day, from discriminatory policies 
against the Russian-speaking minority?  It is a fundamental question for Estonia whether 
it can find a new approach in its minority policy without admitting that the State made a 
series of mistakes with respect to Russian-speakers when independence was regained.  
This, however, can only happen if Estonian politicians develop the feeling that such a 
confession would not be exploited as a weakness; consequently, it can hardly develop as 
a result of outside pressure. 
                                                        
 35 The mandate for the Estonian “legal chancellor” was possibly broadened in spring 1999 in order to 
play an ombudsman-like role.  His duty has been to examine laws with regard to their conformity 
with the Constitution.  In October, the Government endorsed a bill which entrusted him in addition 
with supervising the activity of public servants and defending people’s rights.  It remained unclear 
who among the staff of the legal chancellor should fulfil the duty, how people can address this 
institution and where it is situated.  Representatives of Russian-speakers call it “a decoration for 
international consumption.” 
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3. The perspectives of non-state actors  
Most people in Estonia neither know nor care about the Mission.  Estonians within the 
ruling political class mostly articulate discontent with the Mission, or declare that it is an 
unimportant office; a few admit that it has developed some usefulness.  The 
representatives of the Russian-speaking minority pay more attention to the Mission 
without being of the same opinion.  The closer the contacts with the Mission, the more 
the Mission is of direct use for a person, and the less one is interested in general political 
and human rights questions, the more the Mission is appreciated.  One also comes across 
people who are contemptuous of those persons who petition diplomats rather than 
putting energy into a direct struggle for democratic developments in Estonia. 
Many visitors who had been protected against arbitrary treatment with the help of the 
Mission expressed their gratitude by sending cakes, flowers or thank-you letters.  One 
can find enthusiastic supporters of the Mission’s work who are grateful for plenty of 
ideas, for good advice regarding the development of projects, for help in formulating 
applications, for making contacts, for support in preparation for a trip abroad and even 
for advice concerning a speech to be given in English at an international conference.  
They also appreciate the information and materials provided free of charge as well as the 
role of the Mission as a representative of European structures and as a bridge between 
Estonia and abroad.  There is also much hope that the Mission will contribute to creating 
similar European structures in Estonia, to building democracy and to surmounting 
Estonian provincialism.  If the Mission were to end, one is particularly afraid for the 
Estonian Northeast which would be totally cut off from international contact.  
The most disputed issue, however, is whether the Mission really contributes to problem-
solving in Estonia or whether it hinders even this.  One group of interviewees appreciates 
that the Mission helps to calm Russian-speakers, but to expect it to  influence law-
making is too much to ask for.  They also praise the Mission’s vital contribution to 
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improving the relationship between the Estonian and Russian States as well as the 
Mission’s pragmatic approach to softening Estonian politics towards Russian-speakers—
an approach that is expected to improve the human rights situation in the long run.  
Short reports in Estonian newspapers on Russian-speaking children and summer camps 
are taken as an indicator that the Mission has found a way of talking about the 
“humanitarian problems” of the group and of avoiding the difficult term “human rights”.  
This would help— if not politicians at the top, then their employees— to understand that 
the living conditions of Russian-speakers are part of Estonia’s national interests.  The 
Mission is given credit for the fact that the international community knows about the 
Russian-speakers’ experience and particular problems.  What is also positively 
emphasised is that the Mission is available in crisis situations and has a disciplinary 
impact on the actors.  Activity Reports are unanimously characterised as glossing things 
over; a few interviewees, however, found that the reports give more information to the 
international community than would the alternative, i.e. information provided solely by 
the Estonian government.  
This positive response is contrasted by the voices commenting rather critically and even 
bitterly on the Mission.  Discontent is expressed because the Mission does not try hard 
enough to achieve real changes in Estonian citizenship policy.  Many persons believe that 
the EU, with its strong economically-founded interests, will pressure Estonia more 
intensively than the Mission whose members are sometimes accused of behaving as if 
they were part of the Estonian government.  In reading the following paragraph, one 
should bear in mind that it tries to mirror the ideas, attitudes and feelings of outside 
actors, and that this necessarily will not concur with the aims and real work of the 
Mission and all of its members.  Some of the complaints result from an extremely 
negative experience with one particular Mission member only, and this was transmitted 
to the institution itself.
36
  Despite the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
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 Serious damage was caused, for instance, by the plotting of a former Deputy HoM who tried to 
influence the human rights NGO LICHR to act on a case which primarily concerned conflicts 
between criminal groups.  After the NGO decided that this was beyond its mandate, the Deputy HoM 
seemed to ignore the NGO.  Later, it turned out that he felt entitled to conduct inquiries into the 
practices of LICHR and communicated unsubstantiated rumours to an Embassy in Tallinn— the one 
financing the organisation.  The Mission supported the protesting LICHR against the former Deputy 
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attacking the Mission continuously, a main complaint concerns what is called the 
Mission’s timidity or even obsequiousness towards the Estonian government, and 
particularly towards that particular Ministry.  One HoM was even prepared to sacrifice 
Mission members in order to satisfy this hated “ministry of propaganda” that uses the 
weak position of female Mission members in order to transform a diplomatic mistake—
no matter how small— into submissiveness.
37
  Mission members demonstrated that they 
were not at all interested in crucial information on real life in the country.  The NGOs 
which could touch upon human rights during seminars were not invited to join the 
events.  The Mission would try to prevent the slightest expression of criticism.  Whereas 
during Soviet times only the government had expected everybody to praise the existing 
life, the same now was expected by  respected international institutions.  It is also 
negatively perceived that the Mission partly supported the Estonian ideology.  Some 
diplomats made a distinction between a so-called “civilised”, West European, Estonian 
part of the population and Russians, which were expected to integrate.  They would 
overlook asymmetries between the two sides and the fact that Russian-speakers, 
although unwelcome, were members of the Estonian society not in need of integration 
but acceptance.  Because the OSCE Representative had accepted, in one case, that a 
former Soviet officer suffering from cancer be denied a residence permit, the OSCE 
shared the responsibility for the prevailing inhumanity in Estonia.  A few of the 
interviewees got the impression that some diplomats shared the government’s contempt 
for ordinary Russian-speakers because they were poor and behaved helplessly.  Whereas 
persons holding a representative function were treated politely, this was not the case with 
respect to ordinary people whose mentality was not accepted and who became a target 
of re-education strategies.  Social problems, such as the impoverishment of Russian-
speakers and the emigration of intellectuals to Russia, were not taken seriously.  Most 
former Mission members, when they left the country because of their replacement, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
HoM; however, one can imagine that this added very much to the atmosphere of mistrust.  Similar 
cases were also reported regarding other OSCE missions. 
 
 
37 Mission members tell the story differently, and every one of them has a personal view.  Again, this 
paragraph deals with the way such incidents— which do occur and can neither be avoided nor be 
hidden from the public— are perceived. 
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themselves indicated that they were unable to understand how intellectuals could live in 
the country— however, they never reported their real impressions officially.  
Sharp critique is expressed over the Mission’s understanding of the mandate.  The 
feeling is also that the Mission was in favour of de-politicisation of the conflict, and 
would not push for solving the problems but rather hide them the same way the 
government does.  The Mission acted as a social worker at best, helping in one case or 
another without understanding the political nature of the problems.  The Mission would 
ask for amendments of certain laws but wait for changes with time.  By no means would 
the Mission try to facilitate people’s struggle for their rights.  Some interviewees could 
not understand why the Mission had never taken a stance against the discrimination 
against Russian-speakers, and they point to their impression that the international 
community would not have hesitated to do so in other cases.  Because the human rights 
situation in Estonia was not as serious as was the case with South Africa during the 
Apartheid regime, it should have been easier to address problems and to solve them.  The 
Mission shared the Estonian excuse that, because of Estonia’s history, all aspects of 
social life needed particular reconsideration and that it would therefore neglect the 
universal nature of human rights which do not allow for “ethnic reservations”.  With the 
Mission in Tallinn, the OSCE pretended that Europe was concerned about the situation 
of the Russian minority; actually, however, it worried only about how to please the 
Estonian government.  The mandate was neglected because co-operation with the people 
was substituted by co-operation with the government.  The Mission would not help 
people change the situation but only try to make them accept the discriminatory rules of 
the government’s game.  
The Mission is also accused of lacking professionalism.  A frequent change of diplomats 
and lack of training meant that their work would end just when they had become familiar 
with the problems.  Sometimes, Mission members represented a risk to persons 
belonging to the Russian minority, either because of their naiveté or because of assumed 
contacts to secret services.  Communication is accused of being one-sided. A 
representative of an NGO would play all the cards on the table without learning  anything 
about the person contacted in the Mission.  Instead of talking with each other as equals 
and informing each other about one’s ideas, diplomats would hide themselves behind the 
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sending organisation.  Possibilities for commenting frankly on the Mission’s work and for 
discussing reservations did not exist.  One HoM had asked NGO representatives to 
complain in writing— however, that would have meant denouncing a person without 
seeing the consequences.  Concerns were not about this or that mistake of a diplomat, 
but about the general concept and about the HoM who was shirking his responsibilities 
for that mistake.  Staff members are said to lack qualifications regarding the international 
human rights system, or pretend not to know the general trend nor details, for example, 
about the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, about relevant international human rights experts or about specialist 
literature.  Intellectuals sneer at an office which even lacks a library.  Especially the HoM 
would not communicate enough with the relevant NGOs.  Most interviewees could not 
understand the lack of transparency in the Mission’s work.  Lack of transparency only 
helped the Estonian government to continue with its undemocratic policies and so the 
Mission itself is held responsible for this.  Those interviewees who knew the mandate of 
the Mission also knew that the mandate does not demand that the Mission keep its 
distance from the public.  For believers in democracy, it is not acceptable that individuals 
who are seeking advice are used as a source of information without being given access to 
the handling of this information.  Every democratic institution should be obliged to 
present an annual report— as should an OSCE Mission.  If the public gets more 
information about what the staff is really doing, their margin for manoeuvre could 
become wider and people could develop patience and understanding for the lengthiness 
of getting things done.  The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is said to hold a 
monopoly on discussion.  It uses the advice of foreign experts who— if approved—
receive all information on domestic and foreign affairs including the Mission reports 
which are not available to local experts.  Estonian academics who attend international 
conferences feel hurt when they must ask international experts for information on the 
policies conducted by their own country and are upset by the fact that scientific reflection 
on the OSCE, and even on the Mission to Estonia, is only possible from abroad.  Instead 
of enabling a rational debate, rumours were circulating about single diplomats, their 
character, their love affairs or even secret service activities.  This could easily be brought 
to an end by increasing transparency.  
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Despite such a sharp critique of the Mission’s work, no single interviewee would like to 
see it withdrawn.  Even those criticising it in strong terms accept the Mission as a 
glimmer of hope.  All criticism is not meant as a call for an end of the Mission but as a 
plea for a different way of putting the existing mandate into practice.  
 
4. Transformation of the approach - A wish list  
Having in mind the entire spectrum of the Mission’s activities, one will find that the 
Mission’s specificity is to be of some use to a variety of actors to such an extent that no-
one could seriously want the Mission to end.  In the international arena, no other source 
of information and co-ordination is more qualified and more economical.  Its presence in 
case of a crisis and its mediating function— between international expectations towards 
Estonia, the power interests of the Estonian political class, the interests of persons 
belonging to the discriminated Russian minority, mostly interested in securing their 
personal life, and the interests of more politicised NGOs— is obviously a stabilising 
factor which is appreciated regardless of the actual state of tensions.  In contrast to the 
common saying that offices tend to prolong their activities, even when they have become 
superfluous, in order to save jobs, one must admit that among the group of OSCE 
diplomats no personal interest developed in doing the extremely demanding job longer 
than necessary.  The suggestion, however, that the Mission became somehow too useful 
for the actors in the conflict in order to be allowed to find real solutions to existing 
problems (Birckenbach 1998: 15-17), meets the agreement of Mission members or is at 
least regarded as definitely interesting. 
Because of the dispute on the Mission’s presence and the flexibility of the mandate, its 
work has changed and expanded in the past.  The most visible indicators are the 
Mission’s withdrawal from the public eye, its abandonment of self-portrayal, the 
reduction of transparency, a stronger backing for the Estonian government as well as 
involvement in NGO projects and increased work on regional development, environment, 
economy and energy issues— questions which are all linked to minority issues and the 
prospects for Ida-Virumaa.  In the future, a transformation of the approach is more 
probable than a general closing down of the Mission.  
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All interviewees inside and outside the Mission were asked to name their wishes 
regarding such a transformation process; the results are presented here without further 
comments in order to raise awareness regarding the broad spectrum of ideas and 
expectations.  The list refers to international values including social development, 
transparency, dialogue between politicians, researchers and other societal actors, 
Estonian-Russian relations, preventive diplomacy and the composition of the personnel.
38  
a.  International values including social development 
The Mission is asked to urge Estonia to join all international conventions without 
reservations, in particular: the UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
(1954); the UN Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957); the UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960); the UN Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (1961); the European Social Charter (1961); the European 
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level (1992); the 
Convention of the International Commission of Civil Status to Reduce the Number of 
Cases of Statelessness (1973); the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (1992); the European Convention on Nationality (1997).  The Mission is 
asked to state its commitment to generally accepted values.  Instead of statements, it 
could organise seminars for politicians and NGOs on the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and, thereby, 
demonstrate that the diplomats themselves are serious about it.  This procedure is also 
proposed for conventions not yet signed by Estonia. 
The Mission is expected to take up human rights issues, such as freedom of religion, 
independently of the fact that the Russian State shows little interest in the future of the 
Orthodox Church in Estonia.  For believers, the Orthodox churches provide some of the 
few public spaces where a Russian speaker can still feel at home.  It should not be left to 
Estonia nor Russia to decide which human rights are important.  
The Mission is asked to act against the stereotype of Russians as an inferior people and 
to make it clear that not only the Estonian-speaking but also the Russian-speaking 
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 It is not the duty of this report to address the question of how this wish list could be realised in 
light of the complicated situation.  That would be a great challenge for a seminar on this topic.  
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population suffered during the war and Soviet rule.  An international organisation should 
not allow individuals to be negatively stereotyped by Estonian politicians seeking to 
cover up their own mistakes during their term in office.  The Mission should explain that 
Russian-speakers are not inferior but poor, that the majority of them supported Estonian 
independence, that Russia is not really interested in them but is through with them since 
long, and this is why the international community must care about their fate.  
Furthermore, the Mission should make it clear that contempt for the Russian language 
and ignorance towards the Russian minority cause many unnecessary problems for 
Estonia itself. 
The Mission is further required to pay more attention towards practical aspects of the 
implementation of laws and to give more emphasis to the social consequences of 
discriminatory legislation.  Independently of the fact that the Russian minority is 
politically oppressed, the group has lost its social possibilities to articulate the needs of 
its members.  The Mission was criticised for not dealing strongly enough with the real 
division in the country between the highly privileged (5-10%), the underprivileged (10-
15%), and the remaining families (75-85%) separated from the others by a large income 
and consumption gap.  Estonian experts who have studied the issue when contributing to 
the annual UNDP Development Report recognise the helplessness against this social 
factor and fear that it might cause insurmountable internal barriers in an environment 
where people expect the state to guarantee an egalitarian society.  These experts wish 
that the international community would act more actively on the danger of deprivation 
leading to social alienation, exclusion and fragmentation. 
 
b.  Increased transparency 
The Mission should no longer work like a secret service institution but rather like an 
exemplary organisation and explain the reason for its existence to the public.  If it is 
really convinced about what it writes in the Activity Reports with respect to Estonian 
conformity with European behaviour, then its further prolongation is superfluous.  The 
Mission should not only report to governments but also distribute reports informing the 
public about the Mission’s view of the present situation, where problems lie, proposals 
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for improving the situation, and about the Mission’s work: statistical data on visitors, 
results of seminars and other activities, understanding of the mandate, and co-operation 
with the government. 
The Mission’s image as a controlling institution should be replaced by an image of 
partnership.  Its Reports could be published together with comments by Estonian 
politicians and provoke discussions in newspapers.  The respective ministries could then 
report on their activities in order to find solutions to the problems.  All this would serve 
to demonstrate that Estonia is not involved in a bloody inter-ethnic conflict but is 
prepared for democratic argument and civil debate. 
The media in particular should receive official and regular information on the OSCE and 
the Missions’ activities, starting with an improvement of the OSCE homepage.  The 
Mission should establish its own homepage in English, Estonian and perhaps also in 
Russian, and use it to inform the public on its activities, to publish at least extracts of its 
reports, as well as press releases; these materials could be studied whether the media 
reports on them or not.  It is further proposed to institutionalise an OSCE information 
centre.  In a country where nearly no information on the OSCE is available, a Mission 
must enlighten people about the Organization with respect to its aims in all aspects 
including security and the human dimension.  
 
c.  Dialogue among politicians and civil society  
The Mission is asked to enlarge its legal advice services for parliamentarians by raising 
awareness for the means of achieving social and political integration.  For this purpose, 
the Mission should help to improve relations between parliamentary factions and political 
parties, and motivate the individualistic and reserved politicians to become more open to 
contacts with the factions.  
The Mission should encourage the development of the Estonian academic elite and 
discussion of disputed issues in Estonia.  One idea is for the Mission to arrange regular 
meetings of researchers and politicians to discuss Estonian foreign policy and other 
international issues.  The best option would be to establish an “OSCE club”.   
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The Mission should take initiatives more often; the HoM especially should visit 
overworked NGOs and underpaid intellectuals and discuss new initiatives with them 
instead of waiting for supplicants to knock at his door.  The Mission should enhance the 
chances of developing NGOs with a particular interest in dialogue between Estonian- and 
Russian-speaking groups.  This would better serve to prevent the formation of a Russian 
diaspora acting on behalf of the interests of the Russian State rather than organising 
formal Estonian language training. 
 
 
d.  Improving the Estonian-Russian Relationship   
The Mission should help organise conferences in order to improve Estonian-Russian 
relations and to stimulate the creation of a Russian-Estonian inter-parliamentary 
commission which would meet in Moscow and Tallinn, alternately.  The Mission could 
contribute to establishing direct contacts between Russian and Estonian officials in 
Tallinn.  Until now, the Russian embassy has learned about Estonian decisions 
concerning the Russian minority only through the press or informal talks.  Informing 
each other more officially would mean that both sides could better prepare their public 
statements and avoid imprudent rhetoric.  Direct contacts should start with the foreign 
ministers rather than at the level of ambassadors and their staff.  The public should be 
informed about meetings in which the OSCE acts as a neutral observer.  Information 
should be given in order to calm both sides: Russian-speakers who might feel abandoned 
as well as Estonians who might fear that Russia will gain influence in Estonian affairs.  
The Mission should further intensify its involvement with respect to the Estonian-Russian 
border in order to improve the situation of the Seto people living in this area. 
 
e.  Preventive diplomacy  
Diplomats propose in-depth research on the Mission’s work as a precondition for the 
transfer of experiences.  Other interviewees propose that the Mission endeavour to 
transfer its experiences.  In particular, decentralisation of the office could serve as a 
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model for other OSCE Missions, for instance in Latvia.  The CoE should elaborate a 
convention on conflict prevention which would enable the OSCE to accelerate its 
activities in cases like Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland.  Such a convention could further 
raise awareness that the OSCE and preventive approaches deserve political support.  The 
Mission in Tallinn should include young Estonians in its work and train them for similar 
work abroad, thereby surmounting the rule established by the OSCE which prevents the 
local population from working on OSCE tasks within their own country. 
 
f.  Composition and size of the Mission’s staff 
The Mission should increase its competence for discussing human rights issues.  A 
disputed issue is the optimum size of the staff.  Male diplomats think that any increase of 
personnel would send the wrong signal and indicate the increase of tensions in Estonia; 
more personnel would only expand the Mission’s activities without relieving the strain.  
Female staff members, who are more intensively involved in managing NGO-related 
projects, would welcome a growth of personnel.  They think that the current number of 
diplomats is insufficient in order to really encourage the development of civil society.  
Male diplomats share the opinion that these efforts are too small to make a real 
difference.  However, they want other institutions to do the job.  It was proposed that  
researchers from abroad help establish a scientific research institution on minority issues 
in Ida-Virumaa and— with the assistance of local actors— continuously provide 
information on the integration process and transfer experiences.  It was also proposed 
that the HoM and his Deputy should be trained in management skills, including 
knowledge of the country and its languages.  Both should also know how to function in a 
multicultural environment and how to foster the enthusiasm of the Mission members.  All 
staff should be trained beforehand.  Teamwork should be encouraged and sexism should 
disappear.  There ought to be an even mix of men and women.  In conformity with 
European demands for equality, a strong woman should be appointed  as HoM and/or 
Deputy and it should be clear from the beginning of her term that she, as well as the 
other diplomats, will stay longer than six months.  Female staff members wish that the 
OSCE would establish an OSCE Liaison Officer for gender issues, who would be in 
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continuous contact with the women and men serving in missions, and would discuss 
issues of equality, non-discrimination, sexual harassment and other work-related threats 
as well as promote gender-sensitivity training for all persons who are going to work at an 
OSCE mission. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The Mission to Estonia is only one of several long-term missions established by the 
OSCE during the 1990s.  Whereas a generalisation of the findings of this investigation 
does not seem appropriate as regards those missions deployed in Former Yugoslavia,
39
 it 
might be more relevant with respect to the majority of long-term missions, for various 
reasons: 
 
i. They all run up against a constellation of conflict which is highly complex and which 
concerns all-European stability.  
 
ii. The disputed issues of citizenship, minorities and language are nearly the same for 
the OSCE Long-term Mission in Latvia. They also play a role in other areas where 
the OSCE has deployed a mission, although they have not gained the same priority 
at all these places.  
 
iii. As regards their organisational aspects, missions follow the same pattern.  Most of 
the long-term missions are rather small in size and have a low budget.  Mandates are 
short-term but periodically prolonged with the agreement of the host state, and are 
broad and flexible.  They aim to affect political leaders as well as civil society.  They 
try to function as a bridge between the local and the international, and they pursue a 
multilevel approach addressing bilateral and international actors, NGOs as well as 
political representatives. 
 
iv. All long-term missions focus primarily on dialogue rather than coercion.  Although 
not all of them function without military personnel— as has been the case with the 
Mission to Estonia— they rather abstain from relying upon military means or other 
instruments of threat.  The underlying philosophy is very much an outcome of the 
early 1990s when trust in international organisations and in the OSCE was in the 
upwind and optimism was strong as regards both surmounting the division between 
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East and West as well as the emergence of civil society in OSCE member states.  
Consequently, the missions were designed to act without stealing the conflict from 
the domestic parties by imposing a solution on them.  Instead, the concept has been 
to empower the parties to achieve conflict transformation and to create space for 
human and minority rights through co-operation.  
 
v. The work of a mission depends basically on a number of conditions which are 
difficult to influence by the Mission itself: decisions in OSCE headquarters in 
Vienna, the relationship between Western states and Russia, acceptance by the host 
state, financial resources and qualification of the personnel.  Much leeway is given to 
the respective HoM, who is not chosen by the Mission but seconded by an OSCE 
member state.  He is at the top of the Mission hierarchy and decides how the 
mandate will be carried out and how much space will be given to the individual staff 
members.  However, he himself and the staff are often replaced in order to 
counteract the individual preferences of a single HoM or the style and interests of 
the seconding country.  
 
vi. Many of the findings of this investigation related to problems with the composition 
of staff, training, hierarchy, and policy approach have already been referred to or 
intimated in various analyses of other missions (Troebst 1998).  
 
For all these reasons, one may say that, although the Estonian case is particular, its 
investigation resulted into a deeper insight into the variety of roles of an OSCE Mission 
in preventive diplomacy.  They may be summarised in seven points: 
 
1. It has already been mentioned in the introduction that the Mission only represents 
one instrument of preventive diplomacy applied in the Estonian case.  This 
investigation, however, found that the Mission holds a key function which is original 
and irreplaceable by other instruments in the overall process.  In other words, one 
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 These missions may not be compared because of the extraordinary status of the Yugoslav wars 
within European politics and the attention they found as well as invested resources and other aspects.  
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cannot end a Mission like the one to Estonia and continue without major changes, be 
they in the activities of the HCNM, several West European institutions and 
international organisations, or be it the policy of certain states regarding Estonian 
affairs and also regarding Russian affairs.  
 
2. Whereas one is used to discussing the strategy and instruments of preventive 
diplomacy with respect to their impact on domestic actors coming to grips with each 
other, this investigation showed that the Mission— although deployed directly in 
Estonia— is very much designed to prevent international actors (states as well as 
international organisations) from doing the wrong thing, i.e. from either closing their 
eyes and ignoring what is going on in potential crisis areas, or from becoming 
involved in escalating rhetoric and an ominous inner compulsion to act.  When active 
at the Estonian domestic level, the Mission serves a function within international 
politics in Estonia as well as within regional security policy.  Thus, a Mission’s role 
is multidimensional.  It is not a doctor for a specific client but more an advisor to the 
whole family. 
 
3. Consequently, the success and failure of a Mission’s work is not only a matter of its 
direct contribution to the integration of a divided society.  One must also consider  its 
contribution to the overall process.  This might be characterised by the term “good 
governance regime regarding a specific country with special emphasis on prevention 
of escalation of conflict.”  The challenge for a Mission is (a) channelling disputes 
and turning the need for problem-solving from the international floor back home (to 
Estonia); (b) enabling the country to cope with this task; and (c) motivating 
international actors (including Russia) to contribute to the first as well as to the 
second aim.  Generally, one may say that the Mission to Estonia has been most 
successful with respect to the first aim, rather successful with respect to the third 
one, and less successful with respect to the second one.  However, every judgement 
is dependent on the measurement.  In light of the experiences of Former Yugoslavia, 
the Estonian case appears as a positive example.  If one has in mind the need for 
democratic developments and a human rights orientation as a structural barrier 
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against the spread of violence, the question arises as to why progress is painfully 
slow, even in a case when international actors behave comparatively reasonably. 
 
4. One dilemma is that countries such as Estonia cannot meet these democratic 
demands on their own and need international support.  On the other hand, the 
experience is that domestic developments are rather resistant to influence from 
abroad.  Looking at the work and achievements of the Mission, one finds that its 
capacity to achieve certain changes within the domestic political structures (system 
of law, conflict-management and co-operation) exists but is rather limited.  The real 
success is of a different nature. 
 
5. Apparently, one cannot impose democracy nor civil society.  Even if the rule of law 
is established formally with the help of outside actors, this does not mean that 
domestic actors understand how it is supposed to work and that they actually trust in 
it.  Democratisation and the emergence of civil society result from societal 
developments and emerge from multiple processes of interaction between many 
actors, including international ones.  Here is a further role for OSCE missions.  While 
pretending to influence the domestic situation, a Mission can help to win time and to 
assure a minimum of relations between the groups and the conflicting parties and 
prevent them from being isolated both domestically and internationally.  For many 
people, this time-consuming approach is of no comfort because individuals simply 
lose their youth over it. However, even they will recognise that the political 
alternatives are definitely poor (Smith and Wilson 1997).  Without the Mission’s 
activities, all the other actors involved— including the HCNM and NGOs— as well as 
their related projects would be left with less power in the struggle for political change 
in countries like Estonia.  Time, contacts to members of the elite in power, and their 
integration into international developments are essential factors regarding the 
transformation of conflicts such as this one.  
 
6. The Mission to Estonia was able to build its contacts to the elite in power because it 
was well-embedded in an international governmental network of co-operation. 
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However, as regards networking with civil society actors, the Mission to Estonia has 
performed weakly for three reasons which also affect the work of other missions:  
approaching civil society is (a) not without risks; (b) beyond the traditional 
understanding of international politics; and (c) needs a societal basis, which is absent.  
In other words, the Mission must master these societal risks, introduce certain 
changes in international relations and help to create the societal basis. 
 
(ad a) Firstly, the societal weakness of the Mission is caused by an understanding of 
preventive diplomacy that is very much bound to a traditional, pre-democratic 
hierarchical state diplomacy.  The priority on security and stability, putting human 
needs and rights last, means that the work of missions possibly represents a rather 
repressive aspect of international conflict prevention.  An indication of this finding is 
given at least by the actual lack of transparency and the diplomats’ reservations 
regarding an open debate on their work.  Every serious critique, however, must 
recognise that their worries about a politicised public debate are well-founded— at 
least in the context of a society that has neither a democratic tradition nor a common 
stock of reciprocal trust among the diverse societal groups.  
 
(ad b) Secondly, the societal weakness of the Mission is caused by the fact that 
states still hesitate to lend strong support to the OSCE’s approach to security.  
Compared with other international instruments such as deployment of military forces 
or sanctions, the “soft” approach of preventive diplomacy confronts politicians and 
diplomats with rather new experiences.  The missions cannot play the card of 
sanctions or other warnings. Resources are limited to their diplomatic status and the 
mandate gives only certain guarantees that they can act at all.  The results of their 
work are information and persuasion.  The Mission’s strongest international partner 
is the HCNM, an elder statesman.  Even for comparatively small amounts of money 
to be invested in civil society projects, missions need outside support.  All the time, 
the small staff is suspected of not acting efficiently and of wasting resources.  In 
parallel, it is their duty, within the approach of silent diplomacy, when they have 
achieved certain progress, to hint at this, and to arrange for another person or 
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institution to get the credit.  Mission members scarcely have a say on the 
composition of the team, and their training for coping with the situation on site is 
poor.  In principle, they are confronted with incompatible expectations, i.e. to keep 
the situation calm and to achieve progress within the human dimension— i.e. to bring 
the Estonian State closer to human rights standards and, at the same time, to keep 
away from discussions on human rights.  Thus, from a traditional point of view, the 
relevance of such an institution seems to be small and reminds one very much of the 
so-called “female roles”.  
 
(ad c) The Estonian experience shows, thirdly, that whether a Mission is able or 
willing to include human needs and rights at the core of conflict issues is rather 
dependent on whether and how other actors address this crucial question.  In 
general, European diplomats hesitate to deal with such issues because of the 
experience that their politicisation on the international arena tends to cause 
escalation rather than de-escalation.  The strongest driving force could come from a 
non-violent human rights movement with close contacts to actors who could work 
as an ally, like ODIHR, as well as from OSCE officials and politicians from 
countries which are examples of “good practice” in human and minority rights, such 
as Norway or Finland.  The expectation of the emergence of a strong human rights 
movement— society-based, creative and acting transnationally— had possibly 
motivated the authors of the mandates for OSCE missions in the early 1990s.  This 
expectation, however, has been disappointed in recent years.  The dominating human 
rights discourse today gives priority to the mobilisation of “intervention” in cases of 
genocide and other so-called gross human rights violations— a term which seems to 
indicate that human rights violations, if smaller, would be more tolerable.  The idea 
of prevention of violent conflict, unfortunately, has not had much influence on these 
transnational discussions.  As regards Estonia, a social movement that combines the 
issue of human rights with the issue of conflict prevention is hard to find, both on 
the domestic and on the international levels.  Thus, one must admit that, whereas the 
Mission to Estonia has a political base with respect to security in the international 
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world, it lacks today the social basis for any consequent human rights oriented 
policy.  
 
7. Despite its societal weakness, the concept of the OSCE long-term missions is not a 
hopeless case.  Considering how it has developed in Estonia since the beginning, one 
finds that it has not at all functioned as the ideal “impregnable fortress” of some 
diplomats.  Preventive diplomacy is a process and a mission’s role is to serve as an 
instrument in this process, i.e. it must develop flexibility according to the actual 
development of the conflict and the aims, attitudes and behaviour of the actors.  The 
Mission has been through a number of changes.  On the one hand, the Mission has 
improved its contacts with state officials.  Increased acceptance by Estonian officials 
is rather due to flattery; contacts are more genuinely developed with the “soft” 
ministries (education, inter-ethnic relations) than with the “flag” ministries 
(particularly foreign affairs), and they bear a price: the Mission has had to withdraw 
from the public.  On the other hand, it has also improved its activities with respect to 
the NGO sector by becoming involved in certain projects, especially since 1997.  But 
the projects are obviously too small to really make a difference. 
 
Criticisms made within the conflict resolution community, that the OSCE and its 
missions focus too much on state-actors and the demands for intensified attention to be 
paid to societal developments, are well founded.  Stronger co-operation with NGOs 
alone, however, would not solve the dilemma as long as people working with NGOs are 
cut off from state institutions and have no influence on the relevant discourse.  Also, the 
conflict resolution approach of problem-solving workshops as broadly proposed and 
successfully implemented with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict will not really 
change the situation in Estonia because this approach relies very much on intellectuals, 
their professional work and on an academic community which is sparse in Estonia.  Thus, 
the question is not “to make or not to make” a broader commitment to NGOs and 
societal life but how to find an approach which is appropriate to the specific situation of 
the country.  For the Mission to Estonia, this would mean searching for ways of 
strengthening the links between its involvement in society-based NGO projects and  
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more government-based activities.  The lack of embedding in civil society is difficult to 
overcome by charitable projects alone.  But at least they give an idea of how it could 
work in Estonia and in other places.  
Looking at arguments concerning the Mission’s activities, one finds that they are not bi-
polar but multi-polar, and that reservations against them are rather differentiated on the 
governmental as well as on the non-governmental side.  The fact that the involvement of 
the Mission is broadly accepted gives reason to consider how a push for further 
transformation could occur.  There is no hope at present that this will come from Estonia 
alone.  Deep deceptions about the nationalistic turn of the struggle for independence, 
social rejections, fear of getting caught because of one’s own affiliations with the past, 
wounded feelings and the offended pride of many people have emerged in Estonia.  
Society needs to discuss its moral standards.  The members of the Estonian elite point at 
the younger generation without asking where young people are supposed to get their 
morality from if this does not figure in the general public debate.  Without the insistence 
of international actors on enlarging the discussion on the human dimension of security by 
re-addressing the conflict over citizenship as a matter of human needs and rights, the 
OSCE process is undermined on its most dynamic side. 
There is not much hope that a push for further transformation will come from the 
Mission.  Considering the list of what was proposed in order to transform the Mission, 
one tends to react by saying that the Mission is not Santa Claus, and even he needs a 
reindeer to assist him.  It could, however, take up some of these ideas and, for instance, 
contact NGOs and societal actors upon its own initiative, or increase the transparency of 
its work to the minimum of an annual public report.  Another positive step would be to 
support NGO projects designed to spread knowledge on international values and to start 
discussions on the OSCE.  The Mission will not hinder such initiatives.  Other ideas will 
rely on whether both diplomats as well as a group of individuals seeking co-operation 
may be found to establish, for instance, an OSCE information centre at one of the 
universities or elsewhere.  
The current deadlock represents a great challenge to the OSCE in Vienna, to the EU as 
well as to the foreign ministries of the member states.  However, this is also a challenge 
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for those NGOs, including research groups, dealing with conflict resolution, human 
rights and security, and aiming at both contributing to a peaceful and democratic 
development with respect to Estonia and making the case a model to be improved and 
applied in other areas as well.  The chances of making their activities matter are much 
better in Estonia than in most other places because the conflict is not ruled by military 
considerations.  To keep these considerations out of the process continues to be the 
general and positive role of the Mission. 
 
 
 
 
83
APPENDIX 
List of Persons Interviewed 
 
Interviews of at least one hour were carried out with the following persons: 
1. Detlof VON BERG, Ambassador, Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
2. Lt. Col. Christian BISTRUP, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
3. Neil BRENNAN, Second Secretary, OSCE Mission to Estonia 
4. Aleksander DUSMAN, Main Expert on Inter-ethnic Relations of Ida-Virumaa 
County Government; 
5. Dr. Marcus GALDIA, First Secretary, OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
6. Klara HALLIK, Senior Researcher, Institute of International and Social Studies, 
Former Estonian Minister of Inter-ethnic Relations; 
7. Merle HARUOJA, Project Manager, Secretary General of the Estonian Institute 
for Human Rights; 
8. Sergei IVANOV, Member of the Estonian Parliament; 
9. Tiina ILSEN, Assistant at the Office of the OSCE Representative to the Estonian 
Commission on Military Pensioners; 
10. Tiit KÄBIN, Member of the Estonian Parliament, Chairman of the Constitutional 
Committee; 
11. Sari KANTOLA, First Secretary, OSCE Mission to Estonia;  
12. Hedi KOLK, Secretary, OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
13. Eve KUUSMANN, Centre for Democratic Studies, Tallinn Pedagogical University, 
Program Manager, and part time employee at the OSCE Mission as accountant; 
14. Viktor LAHNBERG, journalist in Tallinn; 
15. Petra LANTZ-DE BERNARDIS, UNDP Resident Representative and Co-ordinator; 
16. Capt. (Fg Navy) ret. Uwe MAHRENHOLZ, OSCE Representative to the Estonian 
Government Commission on Residence Permits to Military Pensioners; 
17. Peeter MILLER, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department 
Counsellor; 
18. Bernd MÜTZELBURG, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
Estonia; 
19. Vello PETTAI, Estonian President’s Plenipotentiary at the Roundtable on 
Minorities, and lecturer at Tartu University; 
20. Aleksandr SHEGEDIN, journalist (Estoniya newspaper), Tallinn; 
21. Aleksei SEMJONOV, Director of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 
Tallinn; 
22. Larissa SEMJONOVA, Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, Tallinn; 
 
 
 
84
23. Sergei STADNIKOW, Estonian Egyptologist who took Russian citizenship;  
24. Dmitriy TSVETKOV, First Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the 
Republic of Estonia; 
25. Peeter VARES, Professor, Deputy Director of the Institute of International and 
Social Studies, Tallinn; 
26. Andra VEIDEMANN, Estonian Minister of Inter-ethnic Relations; 
27. Raivo VETIK, Director of the Institute of International and Social Studies, 
Tallinn; 
28. Anna WESTERHOLM, First Secretary, OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
29. Kai Niels WILLADSEN, former Deputy Head of OSCE Mission to Estonia; 
 
I was further able to talk to the members of a fact-finding mission to Estonia during their 
investigation at the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, as well as to contact 
several people present at a reception at the OSCE Mission and at a reception of a 
women’s network, organised by the Nordic Council.  Among them were the following 
persons: 
 
1. Carol BATCHELOR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Legal 
Officer, Standards and Legal Advice Section. Division of International 
Protection; 
2. Walter BELLINGHAUSEN, Lieutenant-Commander, German Advisor to the 
Estonian navy;  
3. Viive AASMA, Director of the Estonian Language Strategy Centre; 
4. Ave HÄRSING, Estonian Language Strategy Centre;  
5. Lars JÖNSSON, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Senior Liaison 
Officer for the Baltic Countries; 
6. Brian P. LARSON, Chargé d’affaires of the USA in Estonia; 
7. Ene-Eha URBALA, Consultant, Estonian Institute For Human Rights, Ida-
Virumaa Information Centre. 
 
I further discussed the issue with a group of students from Estonia, Finland, Russia and 
Sweden who were participating in the International Youth Summer School “Strategies of 
the Baltic Sea Region” in Narva-Jõesuu. 
 
 
 
 
85
REFERENCES 
 
ANDERSEN, Erik Andre (1999). An ethnic perspective on Economic Reform. The Case of 
Estonia. Aldershot/Brookfield, USA/Singapore/Sidney: Ashgate. 
BIRCKENBACH, Hanne-Margret (1997). Preventive Diplomacy through Fact-Finding. 
How International Organisations Review the Conflict over Citizenship in Estonia 
and Latvia. Münster/Hamburg: LIT Verlag.  
BIRCKENBACH, Hanne-Margret (1998). Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions from 
international intervention into the Estonian and Latvian Conflicts over 
citizenship. SCHIFF-texte No. 44. Kiel: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für 
Friedensforschung (SCHIFF). 
BIRCKENBACH, Hanne-Margret and Boris Tsilevich (1998). “Russians” in the Newly 
Independent States: A Bibliography on Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy.  
SCHIFF-texte, special issue. Kiel: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für 
Friedensforschung (SCHIFF), September. 
BLOED, Arie (1997). “The OSCE - Main Political Bodies and their Role in Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Management.” In: Michael Bothe et al.; The OSCE in the 
maintenance of peace and security: Conflict prevention, crisis management and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 35-52. 
BONVICINI, Gianni et al. (eds.) (1998). Preventing violent conflict. Issues from the 
Baltic and the Caucasus. A joint study of the Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 
and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
BOTHE, Michael et al. (1997). The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security: 
Conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
BRUBAKER, Roger (1997). Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question 
in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CARLSSON, Staffan (ed.) (1994): The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The 
experience of the CSCE. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
CBSS Commissioner (1998). Rights of Non-citizens Residing Legally in the Member 
States of the CBSS. Survey Part II - March 1998, Right of Association, Access to 
Civil Service and to other special posts or work. Copenhagen: Council of the 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS). 
CENGEL, Katja (1998). “Tiina’s Widows start a new life”. The Baltic Times, August 20-
26, p. 7. 
CENGEL, Katja (1998a). “Hearing the voices that never spoke”. The Baltic Times, 
August 27 - September 2, p. 8. 
CHIGAS, Diana (with Elizabeth Mc Clintock and Christophe Kamp) (1996). “Preventive 
diplomacy and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating 
incentives for dialogue and cooperation.” In: Abraham Chayes and Antonia 
Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing conflict in the post-communist world. 
Mobilizing international and regional organizations. Washington: Brookings 
Institution, pp. 25- 97. 
 
 
 
86
GRUSSENDORF, Jeannie (1998). “Conflict prevention in the OSCE.” In: Lars Nyholm 
(ed.), OSCE - A need for co-operation. Towards the OSCE’s common and 
comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century. 
Copenhagen: The Danish United Nations Association, pp. 43-56.  
HALLIK, Klara (1998). “From Minority Consciousness to Nation-Statehood: Estonian 
Political Parties on Ethnic Issues.” In: Toimetanud Mati Heidmets (ed.), Vene 
küsimus ja Eesti valikud. Tallinn, pp. 275-278. 
HONSOWITZ, Herbert (1994). “Konfliktverhütung ist möglich. Innovative Wege der 
KSZE.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4, pp 364-372. 
HURLBURT, Heather (1994). “CSCE conflict resolution in practice. A work in progress.” 
Helsinki Monitor 5, pp. 25-38. 
JÄRVE, Priit and Christian Wellmann (1999). ECMI Baltic Seminar “Minorities and 
Majorities in Estonia: Problems of Integration on the Threshold of EU,” 
Aabenraa, Denmark, and Flensburg, 22 to 25 May 1998. ECMI Report #2. 
Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), March. 
JENTLESON, Bruce W. (ed.) (1999). Opportunities missed, opportunities seized: 
Preventive diplomacy in the post-cold war world. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, April. 
KREIKEMEYER, Anna (1995). “Defizite der präventiven Diplomatie der OSZE.” S+F 
Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden 4, pp. 251-252. 
LAHELMA, Timo (1994). “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy - 
The Case of Estonia (August 1993 - June 1994).” In: Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The 
Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The experience of the CSCE.  Stockholm: 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pp. 87-99. 
LAHELMA, Timo (1994a). “The Baltic states and the CSCE.” Journal of Baltic Studies 
25: 3, pp. 233-248.  
LAHELMA, Timo (1997). “Die OSCE-Missionen im Baltikum.” In: Institut für 
Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitk an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH) (ed.). 
OSZE Jahrbuch 1997. Nomos Verlag, pp. 111-118. 
LAHELMA, Timo (1999). “The OSCE’s role in conflict prevention: The case of Estonia.” 
Helsinki Monitor 10:2, pp. 19-38. 
LANGE, Falk (1995). “Voraussetzungen erfolgreicher präventiver Diplomatie.” S+F 
Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden 4, pp. 249-250. 
LANGE, Falk (1997). “Die OSZE-Missionen im Baltikum. ‘Schwestermissionen’ und 
doch verschieden?” In: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitk an der 
Universität Hamburg (IFSH) (ed.). OSZE Jahrbuch 1997. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlag, pp. 111-118. 
LEATHERMAN, Janie (1998). “Conflict transformation in the CSCE: Learning and 
institutionalization.” Cooperation and Conflict 28: 4, pp. 403-431. 
LUND, Michael S. (1998). “Developing conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies 
from recent experiences in Europe.” In: Gianni Bonvicini et al. (eds.). Preventing 
violent conflict. Issues from the Baltic and the Caucasus. A joint study of the 
 
 
 
87
Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
Ebenhausen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 36-79. 
LUND, Michael S. (11996, 21997). Preventing violent conflicts. A strategy for preventive 
diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 
MAEDER-METCALF, Beate (1997). “Russische Minderheiten in den baltischen Staaten. 
Das Engagement der OSZE.” Internationale Politik 10, pp. 39-44. 
MEYER, Berthold (1997). “Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management.” In: 
Michael Bothe et al., The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security: 
Conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp 53 -82. 
MEYER, Berthold (1998):  In der Endlosschleife? Die OSZE-Langzeitmissionen auf dem 
Prüfstand. HSFK Report 3. Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung (HSFK).  
DE NEVERS, Renée (1998). “Conflict prevention in multi-ethnic societies. The impact of 
democracy building.” In: Gianni Bonvicini et al. (eds.), Preventing violent conflict. 
Issues from the Baltic and the Caucasus. A joint study of the Instituto Affari 
Internazionali, Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 99-132. 
NORKUS, Renatas (1998). “Challenges to conflict prevention policy.” In: Gianni 
Bonvicini et al. (eds.), Preventing violent conflict. Issues from the Baltic and the 
Caucasus. A joint study of the Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 19-35. 
NORKUS, Renatas (1998a). “Preventing conflict in the Baltic States: A success story that 
will hold?” In: Gianni Bonvicini et al. (eds.), Preventing violent conflict. Issues 
from the Baltic and the Caucasus. A joint study of the Instituto Affari 
Internazionali, Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 145-167. 
PENTIKÄINEN, Merja (1997). “The Role of the Human Dimension of the OSCE in 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.” In: Michael Bothe et al., The OSCE 
in the maintenance of peace and security: Conflict prevention, crisis management 
and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 
83-122. 
PETERSON, V. Spike and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993). Global Gender Issues. Dilemmas 
in World Politics. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. 
PETTAI, Vello (1998). Developing Preventive Diplomacy And Ethnic Conflict 
Resolution. The OSCE Mission to Estonia. Report prepared for the Columbia 
University Project on Evaluating NGO Strategies for Democratisation and Conflict 
Prevention in the Formerly Communist States (Draft), December. 
PLATE, Bernhard von (1998). “Norms against violence. Intrastate conflicts as a challenge 
to the preventive policy of the OSCE.” In: Gianni Bonvicini et al. (eds.), 
Preventing violent conflict. Issues from the Baltic and the Caucasus. A joint study 
of the Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Ebenhausen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 80-98. 
 
 
 
88
RAIK, Kristi (1998). Towards Substantive Democracy? The Role of the European Union 
in the Democratisation of Estonia and the other Eastern Member Candidates. 
TAPRI Research Report No. 84. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute 
(TAPRI). 
ROSAS, Allan and Timo LAHELMA (1997). “OSCE Long-Term Missions.” In: Michael 
Bothe et al., The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security: Conflict 
prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, pp. 167-190. 
SCHLAGER, Erika B. (1997). “The right to have rights: Citizenship in newly independent 
OSCE countries.” Helsinki Monitor 8:1, pp 19-37. 
SCHLOTTER, Peter (1996). “Die Mühen der stillen Diplomatie: Konfliktprävention und 
Krisenmanagement durch die OSZE.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 5, pp. 27-31. 
SMITH, Graham and Andrew Wilson (1997). “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora: 
The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-east 
Estonia.” Europe-Asia Studies 49:5, pp. 854-864. 
TOMUSCHAT, Christian, Klaus TÖRNUDD et al. “Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on 
the Study of Estonian Legislation. invited by The Republic of Estonia  (December 
1992)”. In: Hanne-Margret Birckenbach (1997), Preventive Diplomacy through 
Fact-Finding. How International Organisations Review the Conflict over 
Citizenship in Estonia and Latvia. Münster/Hamburg: LIT Verlag, pp. 213-234. 
TÖRNUDD, Klaus (1994). “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy - 
The Case of Estonia.” In: Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive 
Diplomacy. The experience of the CSCE. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
(1994), pp. 73-86. 
TROEBST, Stefan (1997). “‘Dicke Bretter, schwache Bohrer’: Die Langzeitmissionen der 
OSZE.” In: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), Frieden machen. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, pp. 147-165. 
TROEBST, Stefan (1997a). “Das OSZE-Engagement bei ethnopolitischen Konflikten. 
Erfolge und Mißerfolge in Osteuropa.” Internationale Politik 10, pp. 31-38.  
TROEBST, Stefan (1998). Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern Europe and the OSCE. An 
Interim Appraisal. ECMI Brief # 1. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority 
Issues (ECMI), August. 
UNDP (1997). Estonian Human Development Report. Tallinn: UNDP. 
UIBOPUU, Henn-Jüri (1995). “Die OSZE-Mission in Estland und ihre bisherige 
Tätigkeit.” In: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitk an der 
Universität Hamburg (IFSH) (ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 1995. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
pp. 159-170. 
VETSCHERA, Heinz (1994). “European conflict prevention: The role of the CSCE.” In: 
Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler (eds.), The Art of Conflict Prevention. 
Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.7. London, New York, pp. 72-113. 
WELBERTS, Rolf (1995). “OSZE-Langzeitmissionen”. S+F Vierteljahresschrift für 
Sicherheit und Frieden 4, pp. 245-246.  
 
 
 
89
 WELBERTS, Rolf (1997). Die OSZE-Missionen in den Nachfolgestaaten der ehemaligen 
Sowjetunion. In: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitk an der 
Universität Hamburg (IFSH) (Hg.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 1997. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
pp. 119-131.  
WOLLEFS, Elisabeth (1997). Sicherheit durch Minderheitenschutz. Der Beitrag der 
OSZE zur Bearbeitung ethnopolitischer Konflikte. INEF Report 21. Duisburg: 
Institut Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF). 
ZAAGMAN, Rob (1999). Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. ECMI 
Monograph # 1. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), April. 
 
